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Executive Summary 
Skills are a major part of the UK government’s industrial strategy, and in tandem with 
this, driving up the quality, scope and range of educational options is central to DfE work.   
The Department for Education has commissioned this review of the recent literature on 
post-18 education in order to understand the wider (non-market) benefits of different 
types of education for individuals and society.  
Approach to the review 
The review employed a 9-step methodology (outlined in section 1.2) informed by the 
principles of systematic reviewing. While the review was not a full systematic review of 
the literature, a set of systematic steps were followed in order to ensure a wide range of 
sources were captured and to achieve a level of transparency. The review included: 
a) a ‘focused review’ of academic literature covering six relevant databases of 
published data; 
b) a ‘grey literature’ review of more than 65 websites of relevant policy, third sector 
and research organisations, identified by the researchers; and 
c) a call for any new or recent research evidence using formal and informal networks 
of the research team. 
Overall, the search methodology identified more than 1,577 sources, of which 483 were 
selected for further review.  
Civil engagement activities?  
The review found that there was limited evidence on the relationship between post-18 
education and civic engagement, and it was difficult to identify causality, rather than simple 
correlation. Additionally, definitions of what constitutes civic engagement and political 
participation make comparison across studies and drawing conclusions from the literature 
as a whole problematic. The review suggests that: 
1. Education increases civic engagement, including propensity to vote, political 
engagement and interest in politics – this happens in an incremental way. The 
more education someone has, the more likely they are to be politically engaged;  
2. Education promotes understanding of political processes and political 
efficacy – people with higher levels of education are more likely to think that they 
understand political issues, to have the resources to try to influence political 
situations and to know how to do so to their own advantage. However, there is 
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evidence that class-based social resources also play a role in determining the extent 
to which individuals can leverage their educational experience to take part in civic 
engagement activities; 
3. Education can promote civic engagement, but the impact can decline over 
time – other social, cultural and economic factors intervene across an individual’s 
life-course. This can be seen in the way individuals adopt the attitudes and beliefs 
of the dominant group in their local community. Higher education appears to make 
people more immune to this decline, largely as a result of the more dispersed social 
networks it creates for graduates; 
4. However, education is often a proxy for a variety of other factors, including 
skills, time and other resources, and studies controlling only or primarily for 
demographic background factors may consequently over-estimate the impact of 
education, in itself, on civic engagement.  
Economic activity and productivity? 
On the benefits of post-18 education for economic activity and productivity, the review 
found an abundance of literature examining the productivity and growth inducing effects of 
education. There is rather less evidence in the literature in relation to the effects of 
education on entrepreneurship and innovation. The literature review has found the 
following: 
1. Education increases the productivity of individuals and has spillover effects 
for colleagues and others working in the wider industry or network – research 
shows that these effects can be significant for all levels of post-secondary 
education, but may be particularly strong for graduates and for vocational 
qualifications at the intermediate level; 
2. Education contributes to economic growth – the studies reviewed suggest that 
there is evidence that education leads to stronger growth at the aggregate level. 
This is true for intermediate level qualifications and higher level qualifications, 
although there may be some evidence that certain types of graduates (such as 
researchers and science and engineering graduates) may stimulate growth more 
than others; 
3. Education can facilitate entrepreneurial activity – while there would appear to 
be little evidence to support a causal relationship between increased levels of 
education and chances of engaging in entrepreneurial activity, there is some 
evidence to suggest that education helps facilitate entrepreneurial success. More 
highly educated entrepreneurs tend to earn more than entrepreneurs with lower 
levels of education; 
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4. Education can stimulate innovation – as with entrepreneurial activity, while we 
found little evidence to support a direct causal link between education levels and 
innovation, there is some evidence that those with higher levels of education can 
help make use of innovation and can help turn research and development (R&D) 
activity into innovation. 
Health and wellbeing outcomes?  
While the literature on the health and wellbeing effects of education was less well 
developed than other areas covered by this review, the evidence suggests that education 
can have implications for a number of health and wellbeing outcomes: 
1. Education can lead to self-reported improvements on a range of subjective 
measures – including: self-confidence and self-esteem; wellbeing and happiness; 
coping with mental health and physical disabilities; and ability to assist with 
children’s education; 
2. Education can improve wellbeing and quality of life – evidence suggests a 
causal link between informal learning and formal learning leading to a qualification 
and increased wellbeing as measured by quality of life scores. Formal learning not 
resulting in a qualification, on the other hand, does not appear to have the same 
effect;  
3. Education can lead to greater job satisfaction and a sense of being valued by 
employers – research found that Vocational Education and Training (VET) 
delivered through the workplace improves life and job satisfaction, can improve 
skills match, can lead to job enrichment and can make employees feel valued by 
their employer. 
On the other hand, however, there is evidence that: 
1. Over-education can lead to lower levels of life satisfaction –where an 
individual’s education level exceeds the average level of the typical worker working 
in the same occupational group they may be more likely to have lower levels of life 
satisfaction; 
2. Education can have unexpected effects on health-related choices and 
behaviours – research has shown that in certain circumstances higher levels of 
education can lead to parents choosing not to get their child immunised and more 
highly educated women tend to have fewer children and to have them later on in 
life. 
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Benefiting local communities? 
The literature on the benefits of post-18 education on local communities largely focuses on 
the attitudes and values developed while in education and the impact these have on 
relationships and community-building. Specifically, the review found evidence that: 
1. Higher education increases tolerance towards immigration – graduates are 
more likely to have a positive view of the economic and cultural impact of 
immigration on the UK - but regression analysis shows no evidence that other types 
of post-18 education have a similar impact; 
2. Further education can promote social network formation and community 
engagement – but much of this effect can be attributed to FE colleges acting as a 
venue for more excluded people to meet others, rather than to formal learning 
activities; 
3. This suggests that it is the type of education that is important, not just the 
volume – across a range of measures, regression analysis suggests that while HE 
graduates show the most liberal and tolerant attitudes, people with an FE or HE 
qualification below degree level have more traditional attitudes than their education 
level would predict. However, there may be a pre-18 ‘sorting’ effect that accounts 
for this difference, which is related to the propensity of people with more 
conservative views to take more vocational study routes that lead directly into 
employment. 
Wider economic, social and cultural benefits to the UK? 
While there is a large variety of ways in which post-18 education can potentially benefit 
the UK, the two most developed areas of literature focus on the development of social 
and cultural capital and social mobility, i.e. the extent to which post-18 education 
reinforces or helps overcome social inequality. The literature suggests that: 
1. Both HE and FE provide opportunities for social and cultural capital 
development – but that factors associated with social class and pre-existing 
‘capital deficits’ mean that participants from lower socio-economic groups are 
often unable to take full advantage of these opportunities. As the participants from 
higher socio-economic groups can take advantage, it is possible that HE and FE 
experience, rather than promoting social mobility, can in fact further entrench 
disadvantage; 
2. As HE has expanded, an increased stratification has developed which 
mimics the previous HE / non-HE divide – access to more favoured HE 
providers and subjects remains associated with social class, leading to continued 
stratification of outcomes; 
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3. The mediating effect of HE participation is weaker later in graduates’ careers 
– and HE cannot completely reduce the effect of social class on opportunity. 
Indeed, HE and, to an extent FE, can be seen to shield graduates from higher 
socio-economic groups from downward social mobility; 
4. Education can entrench existing disadvantage – while there is potential for post-
18 educational participation to result in desirable social and cultural benefits for 
individuals and society, there is also a risk that it can further entrench existing 
disadvantage because of the impact background and prior experience can have on 
educational choice and experiences. Instead of reducing inequality, there is a risk 
that post-18 education experience can reinforce and perhaps even extend existing 
patterns of advantage and disadvantage leading to the development of cumulative 
disadvantage that can extend well into the labour market.  
1 Introduction 
Skills are a major part of the UK’s industrial strategy (Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy [BEIS], 2017). Technological change is expected to increase demand 
for technical and high-level skills. In response the government plans to boost skills through 
a more competitive higher education (HE) system, aligned with the skills needs of 
employers, and the establishment of a ‘world class’ technical education system. Policies 
aimed at addressing these goals include: the creation of the Office for Students, opening 
up HE to a broader range of providers, expansion of apprenticeships, introduction of T 
Levels and the creation of the National Retraining Scheme.  
The Post-16 Skills Plan (Department for Business Innovation and Skills/Department for 
Education [BIS/DfE], 2016) aims to provide two meaningful options for young people: an 
academic route and a vocational route. Both should include options that extend to the 
highest levels of education. Sentiments echoed in the recently announced post-18 review: 
“Driving up quality, increasing choice and ensuring value for money are at the heart of a 
major review of post-18 education”1. 
At the same time, changes to the HE funding system since at least 2006 have intensified 
debates about the value of HE, mostly focusing on the financial returns to HE for individuals 
(e.g. Walker and Zhu, 2013; London Economics, 2011). Research published by BIS has 
attempted to collate evidence on the benefits of HE for individuals and society (BIS, 2013a). 
However, given the government’s goal of broadening the options open to young people, 
and older people wanting to retrain, a broader assessment of the value of different types 
of post-compulsory education is needed. 
The previous work commissioned by BIS, the ‘Quadrants Report’, reviewed the literature 
covering the period from 2003-2013, investigating the market and non-market benefits of 
HE (but not benefits arising from knowledge exchange, income generation or to the local 
economy). Benefits identified in the literature were organised into four ‘quadrants’ based 
on the extent to which they were market or non-market, or benefitted the individual or wider 
society. Examples of wider non-market benefits for the individual include better health, 
longer life expectancy and greater life satisfaction. For society, wider benefits include 
greater social cohesion and trust, less crime and greater political stability. 
1.1 Research focus of the review 
Building on, and extending the coverage of, the previous report looking at HE (BIS, 2013a), 
the current review seeks to establish what evidence is available about the influence of the 
different types of post-18 education (HE, FE and vocational and technical education) on 
                                            
 
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-launches-major-review-of-post-18-education 
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two of the four quadrants (i.e. the non-market benefits for the individual and society) with 
particular attention to: 
1. Civil engagement activities;  
2. Economic activity and productivity; 
3. Health and wellbeing outcomes;  
4. Benefiting local communities; 
5. Wider economic, social and cultural benefits to the UK, and general impacts. 
Research by IER and others has shown that those from some demographic groups face 
disadvantage in terms of educational choices, access, experiences and outcomes, 
particularly related to HE (e.g. Futuretrack2; or see Waller, Ingram and Ward, 2018). Where 
possible we have tried to draw out any systematic variations in the benefits of education 
based on learners’ backgrounds in the text of each chapter. However, our ability to do this 
was limited by the relative lack of studies that have looked at this question. 
1.2 Literature review methodology 
The literature review contained in this report employed a 9-step methodology informed by 
the principles of systematic reviewing. Although the review was not a full systematic review, 
a systematic set of steps were followed in a bid to capture a wide range of sources using 
a transparent approach. The review used the following steps: 
1. Identifying the most relevant (a) databases for published data (e.g. Scopus; EBSCO 
HOST databases: Education Research Complete, ERIC, British Education Index; 
Applied Social Science Index and Abstracts (ASSIA), International Bibliography of 
the Social Sciences (IBSS), Taylor & Francis or Web of Science); (b) web-based 
grey literature (targeting websites of key stakeholders [e.g. HEFCE, HECSU, DfE, 
Social Mobility Commission - SMC], research institutes (Centre for Vocational 
Education Research, JRF); and Google Scholar); and (c) (published and 
unpublished) documents/data/projects gathered through IER networks.  
2. Setting search parameters: Identifying best match to the research question’s key 
words, concepts, phrases in each selected database thesaurus and developing 
search strings (using Boolean operators, field abbreviations, wildcards and 
truncation symbols) and limits (e.g. English language; peer-reviewed; time period 
suited to each search platform/database).   
                                            
 
2 https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/futuretrack/findings/  
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3. Saving initial search records into Endnote X8 and eliminating duplicate records. 
4. Preliminary mapping of retrieved abstracts to develop relatively broad 
inclusion/exclusion criteria (e.g. about the benefits of different types of education; 
focusing on the UK and an agreed list of developed countries but with a primary 
focus on the UK). 
5. Download and storage of full texts of included abstracts in Endnote.  
6. Development of tighter inclusion/exclusion criteria for full texts, including quality 
criteria (e.g. exclude texts containing no research data). 
7. Review of full texts using agreed inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
8. Structured summaries of all included texts (informed by PICOD framework). 
9. Thematic report and synthesis, with bibliography.  
To avoid duplication of the Quadrants Report, the search focused on research on the 
benefits of HE published since 2013, but research published since 2008 for all other areas 
of post-18 education. The search methodology identified more than 1,577 sources of which 
483 were selected for further review. The breakdown of search results was as follows: 
• (a) Focused review: the focused bibliographic literature review covered 6 
databases. These databases are the ones identified as the most relevant to the 
study based on the experience of the researchers and consultation with University 
of Warwick library staff.  The database search identified 1,512 sources relating to 
the wider returns to education, of which 417 were selected for further review.   
• (b) ‘Grey’ literature review and (c) use of networks: this review covered 65 
websites identified as relevant (through the researchers’ experience) to the main 
research questions. This covered the websites of international organisations (such 
as the ILO and UNESCO), European and UK governmental organisations (e.g. 
Cedefop and the Department for Education), other governmental organisations (for 
example, Ofsted), as well as research institutions and third sector organisations 
(TSOs). In addition, a Google search was undertaken using the search terms of the 
focused review.  A total of 66 relevant reports were identified as a result of this 
process. 
The main conclusions from both search processes were as follows: 
• The bibliographic review turned up a considerable amount of literature that needed 
to be reduced down during the second stage of the research. On further inspection 
many of the sources identified were not directly relevant to the research questions; 
• There was considerably more evidence on the non-market benefits of HE than FE, 
or that has looked at the effects of education in general terms rather than focusing 
on a specific type or level of education, although there was an increasing amount of 
research on VET; 
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• The review found it difficult to draw conclusions about the regional dimension of the 
impacts of education, as articles often cover the whole of the UK or refer to a single 
(often anonymised) institution; 
• In many cases it is difficult to disentangle the benefits of education of different types 
studied through different qualifications, modes or completed at different ages. 
Table 1.1 'Search results from the focused review, by research question’ shows the number 
of abstracts that were reviewed against the inclusion criteria and the questions they were 
assigned to. 
Table 1.1 Search results from the focused review, by research question  
Group (based on research questions) Number of 
abstracts reviewed 
Number identified 
for full article review 
Q1 Civic engagement 182 65 
Q2 Economic activity and productivity 274 89 
Q3 Health and well-being 123 46 
Q4 Benefiting local communities 120 16 
Q5 Wider economic, social and cultural 
benefits & General impacts 
813 201 
Total 1512 417* 
*note some articles are relevant to more than one category so the actual number of articles for further 
review is slightly lower than this 
1.3 Structure of this report 
The structure of this report has been guided by the research questions but also by the 
literature available. As can be seen from the literature reviewed, there has been a wealth 
of studies in some areas but far fewer studies in other areas. For example, while there are 
a number of studies looking at the impact of education on economic activity and 
productivity, there are far fewer studies in the UK that have looked at civic engagement.  
Similarly, while the benefits of higher education have been a major concern of research for 
a number of years, further education and vocational education and training has received 
much less attention in the literature, although there has been a growing interest in VET in 
recent years. Due to a lack of evidence in some areas it was necessary to draw upon 
findings from studies focusing on education in general or that were carried out outside the 
UK. 
Each chapter attempts to identify and review the most salient literature in relation to each 
area, broadly defined, and tries to draw out where possible any additional lessons that can 
be gleaned from the research in terms of regional differences and/or for particular 
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disadvantaged groups. The review takes a broad definition of disadvantage depending 
upon the type of education and the overarching context. In many cases evidence relates 
to qualifications gained at different levels but provides no information as to the age at which 
qualifications were achieved. 
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2 Civic engagement and political participation?  
Education is commonly assumed to be linked to civil engagement through increasing 
democratic values and political awareness and through increased participation in civic 
groups. In concluding his 1999 literature review of the nature and extent of social capital in 
Britain, Hall notes “it is well-established that each additional year in education increases 
the propensity of an individual to become involved in community affairs”3.  
The mechanisms through which education influences civic engagement are less well 
understood and the literature published since 2013 adds to this only in minor ways. 
Literature predating this review provides some possibilities to suggest why education 
appears to be related to civic participation: 
• The expansion of higher education may have made people more civic because higher 
education (in particular) encourages critical thinking. This promotes the development of 
cognitive abilities that have been associated with political engagement. Related to this 
is the suggestion that different kinds of study are associated with different levels of 
engagement, for example, study of vocational subjects and sciences has been linked to 
lower levels of engagement in politics4; 
• Adult learning can develop self-confidence that facilitates engagement in civic activities; 
• Education affects attitudes and participation, but what is important is relative education. 
There is not space for everyone to participate, so it is those who have the highest 
educational capital who are the most likely to participate; 
• Political participation is driven by different types of motivation: instrumental, expressive 
and acculturation.  
o Instrumental motivation suggests that more well-educated people become 
more politically engaged because it serves their own and class interests. As 
a result, educational experience (including activities outside the classroom) 
can enhance an individual’s ability to engage in the kind of actions that allow 
them to further their own interests as it provides access to the soft skills and 
social networks needed to do this most effectively. However, this also 
suggests that existing social and cultural capital acts as an intervening factor, 
influencing both propensity to enter different types of post-18 education and 
the skills and networks developed while in education.  
o Expressive motivation links attitudes and political participation to 
socialisation in childhood. It suggests that intergenerational access to 
education promotes values related to propensity for civic engagement. 
Consequently, education has longer-term effects on civic engagement 
                                            
 
3 Hall, P. (1999). 'Social capital in Britain', British Journal of Politics, Vol. 29, p. 417-61 
4 Paterson 2009 
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because it affects the attitudes of students themselves and also the values 
they pass onto their children.  
o Acculturation presents the opposite view to expressive motivation. It 
suggests that expressive ties are modified as people move, for example, as 
a result of education, into a different societal group to those in which they 
were brought up. Acculturation theories suggest that education potentially 
has a strong impact on civic engagement5. 
 
Aside from the failure of studies published since 2013 to explain the mechanisms by which 
post-18 education affects civic engagement, there are also gaps in the literature related to 
the methodologies employed. The primary issue involves the reference group against 
which HE or FE graduates are compared. The reference group most frequently used in 
studies is those with no qualifications6 with assumptions being made about the existence 
of a linear increase in civic engagement as educational levels increase, but with little or no 
primary evidence presented to support this assertion. Such studies have largely been 
excluded from this review, as they do not fully address the question of the impact of post-
18 education choices (i.e. self-selection issues).   
Political participation can be divided into four areas, and the literature suggests that there 
is a relationship between education level and three of these areas (political engagement, 
interest and efficacy) but there is no evidence on the relationship between education and 
political trust: 
• Political engagement, including propensity to vote and to take action on political issues; 
• Political interest; 
• Political efficacy; 
• Political trust. 
2.1 Post-18 education increases propensity to vote 
The prevailing assumption is that because students are often young and typically live in 
relatively short-term rented accommodation with only loose links to the communities in 
which they reside, they are often absent from the electoral role and are less likely to turn 
out to vote. However, Fisher and Hillman (2014) using evidence from the British Election 
Studies in 2005 and 2010 suggest that this is not the case7.  
                                            
 
5 Adapted from Paterson, L. (2014). ‘Education, Social Attitudes and Social Participation Among Adults in 
Britain’, Sociological Research Online 19:1 
6 See, for example, Chan, T.W. (2014). Understanding Cultural Omnivores: Social and Political Attitudes. 
University of Oxford 
7 Fisher, S.D. and Hillman, N. (2014). Do students swing elections? Registration, turnout and voting 
behaviour among full-time students/ HEPI Report 70 
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Furthermore, the expansion of higher education might be expected to lead to a weakening 
of the relationship between education and voting8, as individuals with characteristics 
associated with a low propensity to vote, such as lower socio-economic class, become part 
of the graduate cohort. However, there is also little evidence to support this assumption. 
The BIS review of the literature on the benefits of HE9 found that there was a correlation 
between the amount of higher education received and propensity to vote, but that 
questions of causality were rarely addressed in the literature. Our review provided similar 
findings. 
A 2013 meta-analysis by Smets and van Ham of 67 studies conducted in the US and in 
Europe found that education was among the strongest predictors of voting behaviour. The 
average effect size was statistically significant at the level of tests and studies, but 
education also acted as a social sorting mechanism and proxy for other factors, including 
social class, resources, time and skills10.   
Turning to research carried out in Britain, Birch (2016) found that HE graduates were more 
likely to vote than non-graduates. Using descriptive statistics from the British Election 
Study’s 2015 face-to-face post-election survey and wave 8 of the panel survey, Birch’s 
(2016) showed that HE graduates were more likely than non-graduates to have voted in 
the 2015 general election by six percentage points and more likely to have voted in the EU 
membership referendum in 2016 by three percentage points11. 
Table 2.1 Turnout at 2015 general election and 2016 EU referendum 
 General election 
2015 
Referendum 2016 
Higher education 79.6% 77.7% 
No higher education 73.1% 74.9% 
Source: Birch (2016) 
Bivariate figures for different groups do not on their own show whether HE leads to political 
participation, as they do not control for other factors. Persson’s 2014 research12 using 1970 
                                            
 
8 See, for example, Nie, N., Junn, J. and Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). Education and Democratic 
citizenship in America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
9 Brennan, J., Durazzi, N. and Tanguy, S. (2013). Things we know and don't know about the Wider Benefits 
of Higher Education: A review of the recent literature. BIS Research Paper No. 133. London: Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills 
10 Smets, K., & van Ham, C. (2013). The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level 
research on voter turnout. Electoral Studies, 32, 344–359. 
11 Birch, S. (2016). Our new voters: Brexit, political mobilisation and the emerging electoral cleavage. 
Juncture 23(2):107-110. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/newe.12003  
12 Persson, M. (2014). Testing the Relationship Between Education and Political Participation Using the 
1970 British Cohort Study. Political Behaviour 36: 877 
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British Cohort Study data, on the other hand, does control for the effect of other factors 
and suggests that there is, in fact, no significant effect of education on political participation. 
Instead, rather than causing political participation, education is a proxy for a range of other 
characteristics that are more strongly associated with participation.  
However, research using more recent cohorts suggests that after controlling for other 
factors, education, and in particular higher education, is related to certain types of political 
participation. Paterson’s 2014 analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-2000s – two decades in which participation in higher education rose 
by half – showed that not only has the association between higher education and voting 
not weakened, there is some evidence that it has strengthened13. Paterson (2014) also  
looked specifically at whether there is any regional association with the tendency for 
education to be associated with propensity to vote to test whether relative or absolute 
educational levels had the most explanatory power. Using BSAS data from 2000 for four 
areas: London, South East England, Northern England and Scotland, Paterson 
demonstrated that there was no relationship between relative education levels and 
propensity to vote. Graduates in the area with the lowest level of higher education 
(Northern England) show no greater likelihood to vote than those in the two areas with the 
highest levels of higher education (London and Scotland). This pattern holds when looking 
at the five general elections to the UK parliament held between 1979 and 2005, using data 
from the British Election Survey 1979, 1992 and 1997 and British Social Attitudes Survey 
2001 and 2005, suggesting, again, that expansion of higher education has not weakened 
the relationship between education and civic engagement, and expansion of HE has not 
lead to a decrease in the likelihood that an HE graduate will vote.  
However, research by Kenealy et al. (2017) suggests that Scotland may be an exceptional 
case when looking at the relationship between education and propensity to vote14. Their 
research using a 2015 survey of 6,596 people who were eligible to vote shows that in each 
of the four nations, the proportion who declared themselves certain to vote was lower 
amongst people with lower levels of education. However, in Scotland, voting intentions 
were much higher than in the other nations and even the group with the lowest levels of 
certainty to vote (those with only lower secondary education) were almost as certain to 
vote as graduates in the other three nations. 
 
 
                                            
 
13 Paterson, L. (2014). ‘Education, Social Attitudes and Social Participation Among Adults in Britain’, 
Sociological Research Online 19:1 
14 Kenealy D., Eichhorn J., Parry R., Paterson L., Remond A. (2017). Political Engagement. In: Publics, 
Elites and Constitutional Change in the UK. Comparative Territorial Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 
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Table 2.2 Percentage choosing point 10 on a scale 0–10 of likelihood to vote in 2015 UK General 
Election 
 Degree Higher 
education 
below 
degree 
Upper 
secondary 
Lower 
secondary 
Low or none 
England 63 74 53 56 57 
Scotland 77 78 69 65 74 
Northern Ireland 56 54 43 40 40 
Wales 65 72 57 61 53 
UK  64 74 53 57 58 
Source: Kenealy et al., 2017 
Notes: 2015 survey of 6,596 people. Restricted to those eligible to vote. 
Paterson (2014) also examined the impact of vocational and academic education on 
propensity to vote15. The education measure used was based on qualification titles using 
the approach adopted in the General Household Survey in Britain. Academic education 
included qualifications at all levels, while vocational education only included qualifications 
below degree level. She found that although there were differences in attitudes related to 
measures such as ‘political cynicism’ (i.e. political trust and efficacy), no consistent 
difference could be found using BSAS 1986-2006 data to examine propensity to vote. 
Thus, when looking at the evidence overall, while there appears to be a bivariate 
relationship between education and propensity to vote, other variables such as social class 
and regional factors also play a part. Certainly, the expansion of HE does not appear to 
have weakened propensity to vote and education does appear to have an effect on 
attitudinal measures related to political trust and efficacy.  
2.2 Post-18 education increases the likelihood of taking 
action on political issues 
The relationship between political interest, political action and educational attainment is 
complicated. As has been noted, some forms of political action can be seen as scarce 
resources, i.e. they can be undertaken by a finite number of people. Previous research has 
shown that political participation is socially stratified, with education, alongside income and 
occupation, being strongly correlated with political participation, including contacting 
elected or government officials and signing petitions. This is usually explained with 
                                            
 
15 Paterson (2014) ibid 
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reference to models of civic voluntarism which suggest that there is a ‘cost’ to participation 
in terms of time and effort.  Consequently, people with lower educational levels are less 
likely to participate because they have fewer of the necessary resources, including time, 
money and cultural capital, to understand political information and to take action in relation 
to this information.  
There is some evidence from studies prior to 201316 that the link between education and 
participation is less clear in the UK than in the US, but also that more advantaged groups 
may be more politically involved for other reasons beyond their access to greater resources 
to ‘pay’ for involvement. These include their greater social and cultural capital, i.e. their 
connection to dominant or elite culture, practices and positions, including political culture, 
which helps them to feel that they have ‘the right to speak’17. 
Kenealy et al. (2017) found that, as in the case of voting, propensity to take any type of 
political action is lowest amongst those with low attainment, but is highest not amongst 
those with the highest levels of education (i.e. those with a degree), but instead amongst 
those with an HE qualification below degree level. This would include those who gained a 
qualification above A Level or equivalent but who studied at an FE institution. This can be 
seen most clearly in Wales and Northern Ireland, but is evident in each of the four nations18. 
Table 2.3 Percentage who have taken part in any political action, by nation and highest educational 
attainment 
 Degree Higher 
education 
below 
degree 
Upper 
secondary 
Lower 
secondary 
Low or none 
England 61 63 54 55 50 
Scotland 67 73 64 57 48 
Northern Ireland 61 79 46 52 47 
Wales 69 78 57 49 42 
UK  62 65 55 55 49 
Source: Kenealy et al., 2017 
Notes: 2015 survey of 6,596 people. Restricted to those eligible to vote. 
                                            
 
16 See, for example, Milligan, K., Moretti, E. and Oreopoulus, P. (2004). 'Does education improve 
citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom', Journal of Public Economics, 88, 
1667-95 
17 See Laurison, D. (2015). The right to speak: differences in political engagement among the British elite. 
The Sociological Review, Vol. 63, 349–372 
18 Kenealy et al. (2017) ibid 
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Using secondary analysis of data from the British Social Attitudes survey 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013, Brennan et al. (2015) produce a composite variable to look at different types of 
political action19. This variable includes whether the respondent had contacted a 
government department, contacted a radio or television station or a newspaper, signed a 
petition, raised the issue in an organisation, gone on a protest or demonstration or joined 
a group of like-minded people in relation to a government action that they thought was 
unjust or unfair. Their findings, based on 3,330 respondents of whom a quarter had a 
degree or equivalent and twelve per cent had an HE or FE qualification below degree level, 
show again that those with the lowest qualifications are least likely to take political action.  
However, in contrast to the findings of Kenealy et al. (2017), they found that after 
controlling for other background (socio-demographic) factors HE graduates were 
significantly more likely to have taken part in at least one political participation activity than 
those from other groups.  It must be noted that the cell sizes in both surveys were relatively 
small, which may account for the divergence in findings on the small and somewhat diverse 
‘HE below degree level’ group. Approximately 66 per cent of graduates reported that they 
had taken part in at least one of the activities, while those with below degree level HE or 
FE qualifications were no more likely than those with A Levels of equivalent (54 per cent 
and 53 per cent respectively) to have participated. 
Figure 2.1 How many of the things on this card have you done about a government action which 
you thought was unjust and harmful? 
 
Source: Brennan et al, 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
                                            
 
19 Brennan, J. Chanfreau, J., Finnegan, J., Griggs, J., Kiss, Z. and Park, A. (2015). The effect of Higher 
Education on graduates’ attitudes: Secondary Analysis of the British Social Attitudes Survey. BIS Research 
Paper No. 200. http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/24684/1/BIS-15-89-the-effect-of-higher-education-on-attitudes.pdf  
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Using regression analysis, they found that there was a statistically significant difference 
between the propensity of respondents with a degree and those with an HE or FE 
qualification below degree level to have taken political action.  
Figure 2.2 Effect of different educational levels on political action: regression analysis 
 
Source: Brennan et al, 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
Similarly, Laurison’s (2015) analysis of the Great British Class Survey (GBCS), a BBC 
survey of 164,000 respondents with generally high incomes and levels of education, 
showed that the elite group in this survey (graduates earning over £100,000) were more 
likely to have contacted an elected or government official than other respondents to the 
GCBS and were more involved than UK residents as a whole20. The GBCS is not a 
representative sample of the UK population, but is a useful resource because it includes 
high numbers of highly-educated high earners. Within the elite group, Laurison found that 
there was a correlation between engagement in cultural activities and social connections 
(whether they know someone in a high-status occupation) and political participation, which 
suggests that political participation is a relational phenomenon, as absolute resources 
matter, but social position, and how people perceive the world around them and their place 
in it, are also important.   
                                            
 
20 Laurison (2015) ibid 
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2.3 Post-18 education increases political interest 
As noted in Brennan et al.’s 2013 review21, it is generally accepted that universities develop 
and strengthen civic engagement, through enhancing distribution of knowledge, a sense 
of criticality in the public and professional spheres, and participation in public debates. 
However, there has been little research since Borgonovi and Miyamoto’s (2010) study22 
examining whether education is related to political interest in general. 
Analysis of this issue has primarily used data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
(BSAS). The BSAS asks how much interest the respondent has, generally, in what is going 
on in politics. Brennan et al. (2015) use data from the 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 surveys 
and find that, consistent with other measures of political participation, interest in politics 
was lowest amongst people with no qualifications (19 per cent report a great deal or a lot 
of interest) and highest amongst HE graduates (51 per cent).  
Figure 2.3 How much interest do you generally have in politics? 
 
Source: Brennan et al, 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
However, as Figure 2.4 shows, when they control for other characteristics, such as age 
and social class, there is no statistically significant difference between those with HE and 
FE qualifications below degree level and those with degrees. 
                                            
 
21 Brennan et al. (2013) ibid 
22 Borgonovi, F. and Miyamoto, K. (2010). Education and civic and social engagement, OECD, Improving 
Health and Social Cohesion through Education, chap.3, pp. 65-110 
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Figure 2.4 Effect of educational attainment on how much interest participants generally politics: 
regression analysis 
 
NB: Blue bars denote statistically significant coefficients; grey bars non-significant ones 
Source: Brennan et al., 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
This finding reflects other analysis of BSAS data, including the work of Lee and Young 
(2013) using the same data as Brennan et al.23. 
2.4 Post-18 education increases political efficacy 
Political efficacy relates to how much say individuals feel they have in how governments 
run the country and whether they feel their voice is listened to. This involves understanding 
how governments function and the most efficacious methods for engagement.  
Kenealy et al.’s 2015 survey of respondents across the four nations of the UK assessed 
whether respondents were able to understand the political system, using agreement with 
the statement ‘sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like 
me cannot really make sense of it all’24. They found that across all four nations, 
                                            
 
23 Lee, L. and Young, P. (2013). ‘A disengaged Britain? Political interest and participation over 30 years’, in 
Park, A., Bryson, C., Clery, E., Curtice, J. and Phillips, M. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 30th Report, 
London: NatCen. 
24 Kenealy et al. (2017) ibid 
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understanding of the political system decreased as education levels decreased and those 
with degrees were the least likely to find politics difficult to understand25. 
Table 2.4 ‘Politics is too complicated for someone like me to make sense of it all’ by nation and 
highest educational attainment 
 Degree Higher 
education 
below degree 
Upper 
secondary 
Lower 
secondary 
Low or none 
England 41 48 51 50 57 
Scotland 35 42 48 50 56 
Northern 
Ireland 
45 50 61 62 75 
Wales 39 47 57 57 58 
UK  40 47 51 51 57 
Source: Kenealy et al. (2017).  
Notes: Survey conducted in 2015 of 6,596 people who were eligible to vote 
Brennan et al. (2015) use the 2011 British Social Attitudes Survey to look at subjective 
feelings of political efficacy26. Their findings showed a similar pattern to that found by 
Kenealy et al. (2017), although they found no significant difference, when controlling for 
other characteristics, between those with degree level qualifications and those with HE and 
FE qualifications below degree level. Looking at personal efficacy, Brennan et al. analysed 
responses to the statement ‘People like me have no say in what the government does’, 
while to examine system efficacy, i.e. the belief that the government works for those it 
represents, they used responses to the BSAS statement ‘It doesn’t really matter which 
party is in power, in the end things go on much the same’.  
Overall, 72 per cent of respondents agreed to some extent that people like them have no 
say in what the government does, but this figure is as high as 82 per cent for those with no 
qualifications compared with under half (47 per cent) of those with a degree. 
                                            
 
25 It must be noted that the cell size for respondents from Northern Ireland is particularly small, with 55 
respondents having an HE or FE qualification below degree level, 55 having low or no qualifications and 95 
having lower secondary level qualifications. All other cells have at least 100 respondents. 
26 Brennan et al. (2015) ibid 
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Figure 2.5 Effect of different educational levels on agreement with statement ‘people like me have 
no say in what the government does’: regression analysis 
 
NB: Blue bars denote statistically significant coefficients; grey bars non-significant ones 
Source: Brennan et al, 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2011 
Similarly, Brennan et al. found no significant difference between respondents with a degree 
and those with a below degree level HE/FE qualification when looking at the system 
efficacy measure of views about whether which party is in power matters. They found 
statistically significant differences between graduates and respondents with all other 
qualification levels. People with lower education levels were more likely to think that it does 
not really matter which political party is in power, with 83 per cent of those with no 
qualifications agreeing with the statement, compared to 58 per cent of those with a degree. 
2.5 Post 18 education increases political trust 
While Paterson (2014) looked at relationship between the level of academic education and 
level of ‘political cynicism’ (a combination of political efficacy and trust), he did not look at 
the relationship between education and political trust per se. Paterson’s findings, however, 
suggested that while higher levels of academic education led to more optimism and less 
cynicism, there was no clear relationship between vocational qualifications and political 
cynicism. Brennan et al. (2015), on the other hand, did look at political trust using data 
from the 2011 BSAS. Their research found that there was no relationship between 
education and political trust when other characteristics are taken into account. 
2.6 Post-18 education increases engagement with political 
issues 
As well as looking at the extent to which education is related to propensity to engage in 
political processes, various studies have looked at the relationship between education and 
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particular attitudes and values in relation to political issues. Most commonly, this research 
looks at attitudes to migration, personal relationships and attitudes towards other groups, 
all of which are discussed in Chapter 5. This section looks at engagement with two political 
issues that are currently high on the political agenda: the environment and Brexit. 
The most comprehensive studies assessing the relationship between education and 
engagement with environmental issues use the British Social Attitudes Survey. The 
literature search also found some smaller scale qualitative studies looking at the 
experiences of particular groups of students and the impact of the curriculum in particular 
subjects27, but these studies are not generalisable. 
Using the BSAS 2010, Brennan et al. (2015) looked at respondents’ knowledge and 
understanding of environmental problems using the question ‘How much do you feel you 
know about the causes of environmental problems?’28. As in the case of understanding of 
the political system, respondents with a degree were most likely to say that they 
understood a great deal (55 per cent), while understanding decreased alongside 
decreases in educational level. However, they found that there was little difference in the 
responses of those with an HE or FE qualification and those with A Levels or equivalent, 
around a third of whom said they understood a great deal in both cases. 
When controlling for background characteristics (gender, age, ethnic background, 
economic activity, NS-SEC, household income, whether a respondent was born in the 
UK29 and UK region), regression analysis showed that the relationship between education 
levels and understanding of environmental issues was significant across all educational 
groups. 
Brennan et al.’s (2015) analysis of 2010 BSAS data also showed that concern about 
environmental issues was highest amongst those with a degree (70 per cent) and lowest 
amongst those whose highest qualification was GCSEs (45 per cent, slightly higher than 
the figure for respondents with no qualifications). However, when controlling for 
background characteristics, they found no significant difference in the attitudes of 
respondents with a degree and those with an HE or FE qualification below degree level.  
 
 
                                            
 
27 See, for example, Spalding, R. (2013). “Daring to Volunteer”: some reflections on geographers, 
geography students and evolving institutional support for community engagement in higher education. 
Journal of Geography in Higher Education 37(1):59-64 and Cotton, D. and Alcock, I. (2013) Commitment to 
environmental sustainability in the UK student population. Studies in Higher Education 38(10):1457-1471. 
28 Brennan et al. (2015) ibid 
29 Except in data from the 2010 and 2012 BSA surveys as this variable was not included in these surveys 
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Figure 2.6 Effect of different educational levels on how much respondents understood about the 
causes of environmental problems 
 
Source: Brennan et al, 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010 
Figure 2.7 Self-reported knowledge of environmental problems: regression analysis 
 
Source: Brennan et al., 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010 
Similarly, when looking at responses to the statement ‘We worry too much about the future 
of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today’ from the BSAS 2010 
survey, respondents educated to degree level were the most likely to disagree or strongly 
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disagree with the statement (60 per cent) compared with 41 per cent of those with A Levels 
and 38 per cent of those with an HE or FE qualification below degree level.  
Figure 2.8 We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices 
and jobs today 
 
Source: Brennan et al, 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010 
This disruption of the education level-environmental concern incremental relationship at 
the A Level / HE or FE qualification below degree level was found to be maintained when 
controlling for background factors, although overall the effect of education was particularly 
strong in relation to attitudes about the prioritisation of environmental issues. This may 
reflect the greater impact of job loss and rising prices on those with lower incomes (which 
is related to qualification level). 
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Figure 2.9 We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices 
and jobs today: Regression analysis 
 
Source: Brennan et al., 2015 using data from British Social Attitudes survey 2010 
There has been considerably more research since 2013 on attitudes towards Brexit, and 
much of this work draws on a similar thesis to that posited to explain the relationship 
between education and attitudes towards the prioritisation of the environment vis-à-vis 
prices and jobs. This thesis can broadly be described as the ‘winners of globalisation’ 
thesis. It suggests that the ‘winners of globalisation’ are highly educated and qualified 
people who have the educational, social and cultural capital to compete for jobs and other 
resources that become scarce in periods of economic downturn or through global 
competition.  
Conversely, the ‘losers of globalisation’ are those with lower skills and qualifications whose 
immediate priorities focus on retaining their jobs and standard of living in the face of 
increasing competition and rising prices. Much of the literature highlights that there is not 
a linear relationship between educational levels and attitudes towards Brexit. There is a 
middle group, composed either of those with A Levels as their highest qualification or those 
who have an HE or FE qualification below degree level, whose attitudes are particularly 
affected by globalisation and recession (those who find themselves newly vulnerable).  
Controlling for age, overall, support for Brexit was around 30 percentage points higher 
amongst those with GCSE qualifications or below than it was amongst those with a 
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degree30. Using the 7th Wave of the British Election Study (a pre-campaign Panel Survey 
of 30,895 respondents’ voting intentions prior to the referendum), Hobolt (2016) found that 
going from A Level education to an undergraduate degree reduced the probability of voting 
to leave the EU by around 10 percentage points when all other factors where held equal31. 
Similarly, Curtis (2016), using 3,000 participant British Social Attitudes 2015 data, found 
that graduates were four to five times more likely to support remaining in the EU than 
withdrawing, while there was a more even balance, trending towards leaving, across other 
educational groups32. 
However, there is not a clear linear relationship between education level and attitudes 
towards Brexit. Using British Election Survey (BES) data on how people anticipated voting 
ahead of the EU referendum, Ormston (2015) found that there were higher levels of support 
for Brexit amongst those who had an HE or FE qualification below degree level than 
amongst those whose highest qualification was A Level or equivalent33. 
Table 2.5 Proportion of registered voters who said that they would vote to leave the EU in the 2015 
referendum 
 A Level or 
equivalent 
HE below 
degree 
Degree or above 
England 39 42 27 
Scotland 28 31 15 
Wales 32 47 22 
Source: Ormston (2015) using BES internet panel Wave 6,  
Notes: excluding those who said they did not know how they would vote 
Using the British Election Study (BES) based on a sample of more than 31,000 
respondents surveyed during May and June 2016, Goodwin and Heath (2017) found that 
while the ‘winners of globalisation’ thesis holds, there is an additional geographical 
dimension to the relationship between education and attitudes towards Brexit. They found 
that education can act as a socialising agent that inculcates people with a more outward 
                                            
 
30 See Johnston, R., Jones, K. and Manley, D. (2016). Can we really not predict who will vote for Brexit, 
and where? http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/can-we-really-not-predict-who-will-vote-for-brexit-and-
where/  
31 Hobolt, S.B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 23:9, 1259-1277 
32 Curtis, J. (2016). A Question of Culture or Economics? Public Attitudes to the European Union in Britain. 
The Political Quarterly 87/2. 209-218. It should be noted that the proportion of those people with lower 
qualifications who ultimately voted to leave the EU in the referendum was considerably higher than was 
suggested by responses to this question asked between July and November 2015. 
33 Ormston, R. (2015). Disunited Kingdom? Attitudes to the EU across the UK. The UK in a changing 
Europe and NatCen. https://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Analysis-paper-3-Disunited-
kingdom.pdf  
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looking and liberal perspective, but that the reverse could also occur, so that graduates 
who lived and socialised in communities which were dominated by people with lower 
qualification and skill levels were more likely to vote for Brexit34.  
A similar thesis is proposed by Scott et al. (2017) based on a YouGov survey of 1,661 
adults in August 2016 weighted to provide a sample representative of the British public on 
key demographic indicators. They suggest that attitudes towards Brexit were shaped not 
just by the role educational qualifications play in determining the winners and losers of 
globalisation, but also by the world-view of those with higher education qualifications and 
the social networks people engage in35.  
Goodwin and Heath (2017) defined low-skilled areas as those where ten per cent or less 
of the population were university educated and high-skilled areas as those where at least 
60 per cent of the local population were university educated. Overall, their findings followed 
a similar pattern to that outlined above, with respondents in low-skilled areas being more 
likely to vote for Brexit. However, the authors also found that the attitudes of more highly 
educated people were more similar to those of people with lower educational levels in 
areas dominated by this latter group.  
In low-skilled areas, the difference in support for Brexit between low and high educated 
respondents was around 20 percentage points and support for Brexit was much more 
evenly distributed across educational groups, but in high-skilled areas, it was just under 40 
per cent and in these communities there was much more polarisation along education lines. 
The authors suggest various explanations of this phenomenon. They suggest that these 
highly educated people are nonetheless a ‘left behind’ group because they remain in areas 
that are declining or which have fewer opportunities to use higher skills and education, but 
that there is also an element of socialisation in the development of political opinions. 
Combined, these two phenomena promote and accentuate the feelings of exclusion and 
marginalisation discussed above even amongst this more highly educated group.  
Scott et al. (2017) also discussed the role of socialisation and social networks in different 
geographical areas. They found that remain supporters in low-skill areas often had wider 
and more varied social networks that made them more resilient to their attitudes being 
affected by the prevailing discourse in their local area. Fieldhouse (2014) used the second 
wave of 2015 British Election Panel Study to examine the role of social networks in voting 
                                            
 
34 Goodwin, N. and Heath, O. (2016). Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities. 
York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
35 Scott, R., Cadywould, C., Hilhorst, S. and Reynolds, L. (2017). ‘Great Britain - It’s who you know’: 
exploring the factors behind the UK’s vote to leave the EU’ in Demos (2017) Mapping and responding to 
the rising culture and politics of fear in the European Union: Nothing to fear but fear itself? 
https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1.pdf#page=51 
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intentions, and similarly found that social networks can affect voting intentions across the 
education spectrum36. 
Goodwin and Heath (2017) identify what may be termed as a ‘squeezed middle’ in the 
spectrum of educational qualifications, similar to that identified by Ormston (2015). 
However, they suggest that this group is composed of respondents with A Level or 
equivalent qualifications (they do not include those with HE or FE qualifications below 
degree level in their analysis). They found significant differences between those with A 
Levels or equivalent and the groups either side (those with degrees and those whose 
highest qualification is GCSEs). This is the group that decided at the age of 18 not to 
pursue further educational opportunities, and their attitudes appear to be the most sensitive 
to the community they live in. In predominantly low-skilled communities, those with A 
Levels display attitudes more akin to people with low qualifications, while in predominantly 
higher skilled communities, they hold similar views about Brexit to people with degrees. 
This, again, is likely to be related to opportunities in the local area as well as social contact 
and sharing of opinions between different groups. 
2.7 Post-18 education increases altruistic volunteering 
The 2013 BIS review of literature on benefits of HE published before 201337 showed that 
people who had experience of higher education were more likely to volunteer, but that 
higher education levels affected this somewhat less than some other types of civic 
participation. Much of the post-2013 literature on volunteering and education focuses on 
the role of volunteering by students as a means of developing employability skills38. As the 
development of employability skills has been covered elsewhere in this review, this section 
reviews the limited literature on volunteering that is primarily undertaken for altruistic 
reasons – volunteering to improve local communities and/or to ‘give something back’.  
Research by London Economics and IPSOS Mori (2013) found that half of all respondents 
who had taken part in further education or learning indicated that this had helped them to 
undertake more voluntary work or community-related activity39. The OECD 2013 survey of 
adult skills also found that people with an HE or FE qualification at Level 4 or above were 
                                            
 
36 Fieldhouse, E. (2014). ‘Are we influenced by how our friends vote?’. British Election Study, 10 Dec 2014, 
http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/are-we-influenced-by-how-our-friends-
vote/#.WCWrrdKLTIU  
37 Brennan et al. (2013) ibid 
38 See, for example, Barton, E., Bates, E. and O’Donovan, R. (2017). ‘That extra sparkle’: students’ 
experiences of volunteering and the impact on satisfaction and employability in higher education’ Journal of 
Further and Higher Education, DOI: 10.1080/0309877X.2017.1365827 
39 London Economics and IPSOS Mori. (2013). The Impact of Further Education Learning. BIS Research 
Paper No 104. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69179/bi
s-13-597-impact-of-further-education-learning.pdf  
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more likely to report having engaged in voluntary work40. Conversely, Paterson’s (2014) 
examination of regional variations in membership of civic organisations shows no clear 
relationship between relative levels of higher education and propensity to belong to civic 
organisations41. BSAS 2000 data shows that although membership of civic organisations 
is higher in London and Scotland (the two areas with the highest levels of higher 
education), than in Northern England (the area with the lowest HE rate), it is higher in 
Scotland, which has the same higher education rate as London. 
Three small qualitative studies also investigated volunteering amongst small, select groups 
of students and graduates. These reviews42 did not compare attitudes of students or 
graduates towards volunteering with those held by other groups, so have not been included 
for detailed review. However, overall, they found that students undertake voluntary work 
for altruistic reasons when they feel that they enjoy a particularly privileged position in 
society by virtue of being a student (and in the case of Power et al.’s 2016 study, by virtue 
of being particularly privileged students).  
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has shown that there is a relationship between engagement in post-18 
education and political engagement. 
1. Propensity to vote, political engagement and activity and interest in politics 
increase incrementally with education level. Across all measures, graduates 
show increased political engagement. Those with an HE or FE qualification below 
degree level show lower engagement than graduates, but nonetheless higher 
levels of engagement than people whose highest educational qualification is A 
Levels or lower; 
2. Education can act as a proxy for various other factors, such as resources, 
time and skills, that cannot be controlled for in regression analysis of existing 
datasets, so while simple descriptive analysis suggests that education is a predictor 
of voting behaviour, it is not always possible to attribute causality to this 
relationship; 
                                            
 
40 OECD (2013) Skilled for Life? Key findings from the survey of adult skills, OECD 
http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/SkillsOutlook_2013_ebook.pdf  
41 Peterson (2014) ibid 
42 Dyson, S. E., Liu, L., Van Den Akker, O. and O'Driscoll, M. (2017) The extent, variability, and attitudes 
towards volunteering among undergraduate nursing students: Implications for pedagogy in nurse 
education. Nurse Education in Practice 23:15-22, Kyriacou, C. and Kato, Y. (2014) Original Article: 
Undergraduate students' motives towards volunteer civic engagement in England and Japan. Psychology 
of Education Review 38(1):33-39 and Power, S., Allouch, A., Brown, P. and Tholen, G. (2016) ‘Giving 
something back? Sentiments of privilege and social responsibility among elite graduates from Britain and 
France’ International Sociology 31(3) 305-323 
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3. There is no statistically significant difference between people with a degree 
and those with an HE or FE qualification below degree level when considering 
likelihood of being interested in politics. However, there is a statistically 
significant difference between those two groups and people with no experience of 
HE or FE; 
4. There is a relationship between highest education level and people’s 
perceived understanding of political issues, although again, it is difficult to 
attribute causality to this, as the ability to understand complex issues is also likely 
to be related to the likelihood of an individual pursuing further or higher education; 
5. The pattern is less clear when looking at the particular political issues that 
concern people with different education levels. While graduates show the 
highest levels of understanding of, and engagement with, environmental policies, 
and were the group who were most likely to vote to remain in the EU, there is not a 
linear relationship between education level and attitudes in relation to these issues; 
6. People whose highest qualification was an HE or FE qualification below 
degree level frequently showed similar attitudes on these issues to those 
whose highest qualification was A Levels or equivalent. It has been suggested 
that this is due to the higher vulnerability faced by individuals without degrees to 
forces of globalisation and economic recession who feel that their jobs are 
increasingly threatened by external forces beyond their control;  
7. There is a social aspect to the formation of attitudes towards political issues. 
While there is evidence of a relationship between attitudes towards Brexit and post-
18 educational experience, there is also evidence that the impact of education 
can decline over time as attitudes become influenced by the social and economic 
context of the individual post-graduation. Graduates, who generally have wider and 
more dispersed social networks, are less likely to be affected by local attitudes, but 
in cases where graduates live in communities that are heavily dominated by people 
with lower qualifications, their attitudes towards particular political issues can 
become more similar to those held by people with lower qualifications. 
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3 Economic activity and productivity? 
From a policy perspective, one of the main purposes of education, arguably, is to provide 
the workforce with the skills and knowledge needed for employment, and by extension 
contribute to economic activity and productivity. As a consequence there has been 
considerable interest in the topic over the years, from governments and academics alike, 
particularly in terms of the contribution of education to productivity and growth. Indeed, the 
UK industrial strategy sees ‘people’, and by extension the skills of those people, as one of 
the five foundations that will, it is envisaged, lead to growth and a more equitable economy. 
Policies aimed at improving VET and linking HE closer to the needs of employers might be 
seen as evidence of this intent.   
The Quadrants Report identified from the literature four main ways in which higher 
education is thought to contribute to economic activity and productivity, either at the 
individual or societal level:  
1. Increased entrepreneurial activity and productivity of graduates themselves (Bloom, 
Hartley and Rosovsky, 2006; Dearden, Reed and Van Reenan, 200543); 
2. Increased productivity of co-workers (Machin, Vignoles and Galindo-Rueda, 2003; 
Haskel and Galindo-Rueda, 2005; Moretti, 2004); 
3. Greater innovation and labour market flexibility (UK Innovation Survey, 2009; 
Florida et al., 2006); 
4. Faster economic growth (Holland, Liadze, Rienzo and Wilkinson, 2013; 
Harmansson et al., 2010). 
Using these four areas as a starting point, our review aimed to update the evidence on the 
above benefits in relation to HE and broaden the scope to examine the extent to which 
other types of post-18 education lead to increased economic activity and productivity. 
While there is an abundance of evidence in the literature in relation to the effect of 
education on economic growth, the productivity of graduates themselves and on their co-
workers (areas 2, 4 and part of 1 above), there is considerably less evidence on the effect 
on innovation, labour-market flexibility and entrepreneurial activity in the UK. In addition, it 
should be noted that much of the literature looking at the impact of education on 
productivity ‘spillovers’ (i.e. the effects of education on colleagues and other workers more 
widely) tends to consider the effects on the productivity of individuals at the same time.  
                                            
 
43 Also published in 2006 as: Dearden, L, Reed, H, & Van Reenen, J (2006). The Impact of Training on 
Productivity and Wages: Evidence from British Panel Data. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
68(4), 397-421. 
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Therefore, in this chapter we consider the evidence on the impact of education on 
productivity of individuals and co-workers together. Furthermore, where key studies 
identified in the Quadrants Report provide evidence of the impact of wider post-18 
education on economic activity and productivity, we have considered these here also. With 
this in mind, our review found evidence to support the following benefits of post-18 
education: 
1. Education increases the productivity of individuals, colleagues and workers more 
widely; 
2. Education leads to increased economic growth; 
3. Education has impacts on entrepreneurial activity; 
4. Education can facilitate innovation. 
The vast majority of research on the productivity inducing effects of education comes from 
the economics literature and so attempts to quantify the value of the changes in monetary 
terms, rather than focusing on the qualitative changes that education may have on an 
individual’s productive capacities or the quality of their work. Rather this is assumed to 
show up in economic output and/or wages. Given the time constraints of the review, and 
the relative prominence in the literature, our review tends towards studies that focus on the 
former rather than the latter. This reflects the aim of the research to identify benefits of 
education that can be generalised more widely. However, we have included some 
contextual insights on the more qualitative impacts of education where possible. 
As Rincón-Aznar, Forth, Mason, O'Mahony and Bernini (2015) observe, the literature 
investigating the effect of education on productivity and growth can be seen as falling into 
two main approaches, both drawing upon Human Capital Theory:  
1. Growth Accounting approaches – that attempt to estimate the extent to which 
observed changes in output (e.g. Gross Domestic Product [GDP] per hour worked) 
are attributable to changes in various inputs44 observed at the aggregate level 
(usually at the national or industry level); 
2. Econometric approaches45 – that use data at the individual level (often using panel 
data) in order to estimate the effect of a variety of determinants, including human 
capital, on a given output (e.g. productivity, wages or economic growth).  
                                            
 
44 The main inputs are assumed to be the productive power of capital investment, labour productivity (hours 
worked and the quality of labour, of which human capital is a key part) and Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 
with the latter reflecting the portion of changes in output not accounted for by changes in labour and capital, 
often assumed to reflect things like advancements in technology. 
45 Cattan and Crawford (2013) characterise the two broad camps as – macroeconomic and microeconomic 
approaches – with growth accounting falling within the former and microeconomic broadly corresponding to 
‘econometric’ in Rincón-Aznar et al’s terminology. 
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While one of the benefits of growth accounting approaches is that they offer the potential 
to estimate the total effect of education on the economy, estimates should be considered 
as an upper bound and the disadvantage is that it cannot account for indirect effects or 
complementarities between skills and other inputs such as returns to scale (Rincón-Aznar 
et al, 2015; Cattan and Crawford, 2013). On the other hand, while econometric approaches 
may struggle to measure the wider effects of education on productivity not captured in 
wages, the advantages are that:  
a) they allow for non-constant returns to scale (e.g. at different levels of education); 
b) they allow for estimation of interactions between education and other factors, and  
c) a sophisticated array of methodologies have been developed over time to overcome 
biases or weaknesses within specific approaches (Rincón-Aznar et al., 2015; Cattan 
and Crawford, 2013).  
In both the above approaches education is used as a proxy for human capital and tends to 
be measured by number of years in education, level of monetary investment, or 
qualifications obtained. While there are various pros and cons to each of these measures, 
the latter is of more relevance to this review as it allows us to more easily identify the 
various benefits of different types of education. The reviewed studies that follow mostly 
use education level or qualifications obtained as a measure of education. 
The majority of evidence on the productivity enhancing aspects of education for individuals 
fall into the econometric approaches category. These approaches attempt to estimate 
increases in productivity by estimating the effect of more education on earnings. The 
majority of studies that attempt to measure the effect of education on colleagues or wider 
workers in the industry tend to adopt the Growth Accounting approach (as do studies that 
look at the effect of education on economic growth discussed in the subsequent section). 
Below, we focus on a few key studies that attempt to identify the effect of different types of 
education on the productivity of individuals and wider workers.  
3.1 Post-18 education increases the productivity of individuals, 
colleagues and workers more widely  
In Human Capital Theory education is generally assumed to increase the productive 
capacity of individuals by imparting knowledge, skills and other capacities that will help 
them perform work tasks more efficiently and/or to a higher standard (Becker, 1993). The 
vast majority of studies identified in the review draw upon this basic principal in order to 
estimate the contribution that human capital makes to increases in productivity. In most 
cases education is used as a proxy for human capital and productivity is measured by 
wages or GDP per hour worked.  
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An individual’s productivity is assumed to be reflected, at least in part, in their wages, based 
on the assumption that market forces mean that wages will tend to find their true value and 
that “wage differentials reflect true productivity differences between Workers” (Rincón-
Aznar et al., 2015, p16). There is no shortage of studies that attempt to estimate the effect 
that education has on wages, particularly in relation to higher education, often in the form 
of lifetime earnings or educational premia (e.g. Walker and Zhu, 2013; Conlon and 
Patrignani, 2011; Sloane and O’Leary, 2004; Buscha, Cerqua and Unwin, 2014). While a 
review of such studies would be beyond the scope of this literature review, concerned as 
they are with the financial returns of individuals, it is worth noting that based on the 
assumption that wages reflect an individual’s productivity these studies can also be 
considered as providing evidence of the capacity for education to increase the productivity 
of learners (and not only their wages). 
However, only some of an individual’s productivity is reflected in their wages. An 
individual’s true productivity is likely to be equal to at least the full cost of their employment 
to the employer, or else an employer would have no incentive to employ them (Hayward, 
Hunt and Lord, 2014). This would include non-wage labour costs (NWLCs) such as any 
taxes, pension contributions, benefits and overheads. Of course, even this is likely to be 
an underestimate as it does not take into account any profits accrued by the employer.  
Cambridge Econometrics (2011, 2015) adopt such an approach to estimate the economic 
impact and net present value (NPV) of further education qualifications in England. Their 
analysis assumes that productivity returns are related to wage returns at a fixed rate. This 
is based on the research of Dearden et al. (2005) who, employing data from the UK Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and other sources, found that the effect of engaging in work-related 
education or training led to an increase in 'total productivity' that was twice that of the 
increase to wages, such that for every additional ten per cent of staff who engaged in 
training the effect on total productivity was an increase of six per cent while the increase in 
wages was three per cent. Thus, Cambridge Economics apply a factor of two to estimate 
wage returns in order to estimate the total productivity gains of different types of further 
education (as is outlined below). 
The Quadrants Report cite Dearden et al.’s (2005) study as evidence of the effect higher 
education has on productivity. However, it should be noted that the productivity gains found 
were for any job-related training or education that respondents had engaged in during the 
previous four weeks and the researchers themselves note that it is not possible to 
disentangle the effects for training and education, and so isolating the effect that higher 
education might have on productivity is not possible from the data presented46. That being 
                                            
 
46 The measure of education/training was a positive response to the question ‘over the 4 weeks ending 
Sunday… have you taken part in any education or training connected with your job, or a job that you might 
be able to do in the future?’ 
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said, arguably the research does provide evidence of the productivity gains that can be 
attributed to post-18 learning and training more widely, although it is hard to say what the 
productivity gains are for different types of training and formal education and, as we will 
see, there are good reasons to assume that the productivity gains vary considerably for 
different types of learning. However, the key strength of the study is that it at least attempts 
to measure the wider productivity spillovers of learning directly. 
More recent studies have attempted to estimate the individual and wider productivity gains 
of different forms of education (either at post-18 level or for education in general) using a 
variety of methodologies. Three studies are reviewed here. 
Hayward et al. (2014) estimated the productivity returns for individuals for different types 
of intermediate level qualifications employing a microeconomic approach using data from 
the UK LFS covering the period 2006 to 2013. Their analysis concentrated on the effect of 
qualifications on the productivity of individuals by assuming that their productivity is equal 
to the full cost of employing them (i.e. including a 30 per cent uplift to cover tax, benefits 
and overheads covered by an employer). They excluded any productivity gains captured 
by employers in the shape of increased profits and any spillover effects on colleagues or 
captured by the firm or industry more widely. They estimated the productivity gains of 
holding a range of intermediate qualifications ranging from 1-2 GCSEs at grade C or above 
to holding two A Levels47. The gains associated with holding level 2 and level 3 
apprenticeships were also estimated. The research found that:  
• Overall, intermediate qualifications were associated with higher lifetime productivity; 
• Even just having 1-2 GCSEs was associated with substantial productivity gains; 
• Modest improvements in GCSEs increased lifetime productivity returns. 
The estimated ‘marginal’ returns (i.e. for those holding a given qualification as their highest 
qualification) and the estimated ‘average’ returns (i.e. for all those holding the qualification 
regardless of whether or not they gain a further qualification, while controlling for other 
qualifications) for both men and women are presented in Table 3.1. While it should be 
noted that the qualifications investigated are often achieved before the age of 18, they are 
also often studied post-18 at the FE level. So while the returns to each of these 
qualifications may be different for individuals achieving these qualifications at different 
ages they provide some insight into the potential productivity gains of different types of 
qualifications. 
 
                                            
 
47 Hayward et al. also discount the returns at a rate of 3.5% for first 30 years and then 3% for the following 
30 to adjust for inflation. 
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Table 3.1 Marginal and average lifetime productivity returns for intermediate qualifications 
 Men Women 
 Marginal Average Marginal Average 
1-2 GCSEs A-C £170,984  £110,395  
3-4 GCSEs A-C £59,043 £39,047 £51,055 £28,432 
5-7 GCSEs A-C (inc. English and Maths) £72,999 £60,611 £55,445 £59,019 
8+ GCSEs A-C £2,909 £91,686 £32,592 £36,147 
A Levels £90,486 £57,973 £76,099 £42,982 
Level 2 Apprenticeship £138,999  £67,444  
Level 3 Apprenticeship £175,000  £78,477  
Source: Hayward et al. (2014) Tables 13-16 
Notes: Compared to qual level below, except: A Levels compared to 5-7 GCSEs A-C (inc. English and 
Maths); Level 2 apps compare to any other Level 1-2; Level 3 apps compared to other Level 2.   
Cambridge Econometrics (2011, 2015) also estimated the returns to qualifications gained 
at FE as part of an exercise aimed at measuring the Net Present Value (NPV) of 
government funded qualifications provided by the post-19 FE sector. The researchers 
estimate the NPV associated with different qualifications and then aggregate them up to 
estimate the sector as a whole. In order to do this they estimate the discounted benefits 
(wages and employment, plus spillovers to other employees and employers) over the 
working life of the learner and subtract the costs associated with undertaking the 
qualification (i.e. government funding and fees paid by individuals and employers, as well 
as foregone output). Spillover effects are thought to include:  
• Increased profits or competitiveness of employers due to increased productivity of 
staff; 
• Increased wages for other workers through knowledge transfer or improved 
research and development;  
• Increased profits; and  
• Competitiveness of other businesses (through increased productivity not passed on 
as wages).  
Cambridge Econometrics assume the level of spillovers to be equal to 100 per cent of 
increases in wages based on Dearden et al. (2005) as this was reported to be the only 
study to have attempted to estimate spillovers. The same level of spillovers was assumed 
across all FE qualifications. Their 2011 study estimated returns for qualifications started in 
2008/09 while their 2015 study looked at courses started 2013/14 using a slightly revised 
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model using updated estimates of the wage and employment returns associated with 
different qualifications.  
The most recent study estimated an average return to each qualification started of £34,000, 
although returns for different qualifications varied substantially as can be seen in Table 3.2. 
The highest returns were observed for Level 3 apprenticeships at £88,000 per aim started 
while the lowest return was for below level 2 qualifications (£7,000). 
Table 3.2 NPV per aim and NPV per £ of government funding 
 NVP per aim 
started (£000) 
NVP per pound of 
government funding (£) 
Full level 2 66 21 
Full level 3 – grant 67 21 
Full level 3 – loans 68 16 
English and maths 14 17 
Below Level 2 7 10 
Level 2 Apprenticeship 61 26 
Level 3 Apprenticeship 88 28 
Total 34 20 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (2015) 
While the figures reported by Cambridge Econometrics represent productivity gains NET 
of the costs associated with achieving a given qualification, they give some indication of 
the relative productivity inducing benefits of FE education for individuals and to firms. 
The above two studies have attempted to estimate the productivity gains for individuals 
associated with intermediate qualifications, including estimated firm-level spillovers in the 
second of these. Neither have attempted to measure empirically the productivity benefits 
of education at the firm level or wider.  
More recently, Sena and Añon-Higon (2014) have attempted exactly that, employing data 
from the Annual Business Enquiry (ABI) (along with other datasets such as the LFS) in the 
UK covering the period from 1997 to 2002. Using establishment-level data Sena and Añon-
Higon investigated the effect of employees’ education level (GCSE, A Level and degree 
level or higher), as well as the average education of the wider workforce at the regional 
and industry level, on an establishment’s productivity and how able they were to absorb 
R&D spillovers. The analysis showed that establishments located in regions/industries with 
a more educated workforce benefitted more from R&D spillovers than those in less 
qualified regions and were more productive.  
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While the above studies cannot say definitively how these spillovers occur a number of 
mechanisms have been proposed: 
• More educated and productive workers may boost the productivity of colleagues 
directly through knowledge transfer, research and development, faster 
technological adoption, better training, management skills and/or creating business 
opportunities (Cambridge Econometrics, 2015; Cattan and Crawford, 2013; Kirby 
and Riley, 2008; Mason et al., 2014); 
• By increasing profits and competitiveness of employers by creating a more highly-
skilled workforce relative to competitors (Cambridge Econometrics, 2011); 
• By extending the above effects to wider networks at city, state/region or industry 
level through staff movements, contact and supply chains (explaining why 
graduates tend to earn more in well-educated cities) (Cattan and Crawford, 2013); 
• By increasing other firms’ productivity as they compete through reciprocal human 
capital investment (Cambridge Econometrics, 2015); 
• By allowing managers at a more senior level to think strategically and do their own 
jobs well rather than having to deal with problems that could have been avoided by 
having better more competent staff (Mason et al., 2014); 
• The productivity of high-skilled workers may be augmented by the presence of 
intermediate-skilled workers elsewhere in the organisation (Mason et al., 2014). 
While there is little in the way of empirical research that can attest to these mechanisms 
thus far, they provide a strong basis for future research enquiry.  
3.2 Post-18 education leads to increased economic growth 
Economic growth can be seen as directly related to productivity. However, while the studies 
investigating the effects of education on the productivity of individuals and potential 
spillover effects to colleagues and others working in the same firms or industry tend to 
adopt an econometric or microeconomic approach, studies looking at the effect of 
education on growth tend to adopt a macro approach, often growth accounting, outlined in 
the introduction to this chapter.  
As with the literature on productivity, the effect of education on economic growth is a central 
concern of researchers and policy-makers. The literature searches carried out as part of 
this review unearthed a substantial amount of literature. We have limited our review to only 
those studies that were most directly relevant to the aims of the review. 
The Quadrants Report outlined two studies that presented evidence of the effect of HE on 
growth at the aggregate level, one at the national level and one at the country/regional 
level (Holland, Liadze, Rienzo and Wilkinson, 2013; Hermansson, Lisenkova, Lecca, 
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McGregor, and Swales, 2010). Using data covering 15 developed economies from the 
EUKLEMS48 project and adopting a methodology that incorporated growth accounting and 
econometric approaches, Holland et al. (2013) estimated that: around 20 per cent of 
economic growth in the UK from 1985 to 2005 was attributable to increased numbers of 
graduates. Taking indirect effects into account, it is estimated that for every one per cent 
increase in the proportion of graduates in the workforce, long-run productivity increases by 
between 0.2 and 0.5 per cent. The authors estimate, therefore, that between 1994 and 
2005 at least a third of the increase in productivity can be attributed to the rising number 
of graduates in the workforce.  
Hermansson et al. (2010) employed a ‘micro-to-macro’ approach, involving growth 
accounting and micro-econometric approaches, simulating the impact of an increasing 
proportion of graduates on the Scottish economy. While the precise estimates are sensitive 
to various assumptions, they project that as the share of graduates in Scotland increase it 
will have a major impact on the Scottish economy, both by increasing the productivity of 
the population, but also by providing a productivity related stimulus to the economy.  
However, more recent research suggests that the growth stimulating effects of HE may not 
always be so clear cut. Using World Bank and UNESCO data covering 81 countries for the 
period from 1966 to 2006, Holmes (2013) suggests that moving to a mass HE system does 
not necessarily lead to growth, but having a greater number of researchers (as measured 
by the proportion research degree graduates) does. Employing a growth accounting 
approach, drawing upon neo-classical and endogenous growth models, Holmes’ research 
resulted in three main findings.  
• Firstly, growth equations used in previous research are sensitive to the countries 
included in the analysis (which is often affected by the variables available) and the 
time period covered, and thus should be treated with a degree of caution.  
• Secondly, neither the increase in HE, nor the initial starting point, has a statistically 
significant relationship with growth rates in the OECD or worldwide, although 
Holmes adds a caveat based on the first finding.  
• Thirdly, while the expansion of HE may not lead to growth in and of itself, the number 
of researchers employed in the economy was found to be a strong predictor of 
growth.  
                                            
 
48 The EUKLEMS project ran from 2003 until 2008 and was an attempt to “create a database on measures 
of economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the 
industry level for all European Union member states from 1970 onwards” 
(http://www.euklems.net/project_site.html). 
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The author suggests that high level technical skills are the real driver of growth and that it 
is the skills imparted by HE rather than simply increasing the number of graduates that 
leads to growth.  
However, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, while growth accounting approaches 
have the advantage of estimating the contribution of education to productivity and 
economic growth directly, they cannot account for positive effects arising from indirect 
effects or complementarities between inputs (Rincón-Aznar et al., 2015). Cattan and 
Crawford (2013) recommend using a combination of growth accounting and econometric 
approaches to overcome various weaknesses of individual approaches. 
Two studies that have done just that are those of Mason, Holland, Liadze, Riley and 
Rincón-Aznar (2014) and Rincón-Aznar et al. (2015), both of which attempt to estimate the 
impact of different qualifications on productivity and economic growth using cross country 
comparisons. Rincón-Aznar et al. (2015) break down education into four groups, allowing 
the analysis to estimate the contribution of skills to growth and productivity at the higher 
(degree level or higher), upper-intermediate (university level below degree), lower-
intermediate (A Levels, GCSEs grade A-C or equivalent – level 2 or 3) and low-skill levels 
(below level 2 or GCSEs below C). Analysis carried out by Mason et al. (2014) had the 
added benefit of further distinguishing between vocational and general qualifications at the 
lower-intermediate level. Both studies found significant contributions of qualifications to 
economic growth and productivity, although the precise impact varied depending on 
qualification level and national and industry context. A brief outline of the research and 
their findings is as follows. 
Rincón-Aznar et al.’s (2015) study aimed to estimate the contribution of skills to productivity 
growth in the UK. Using data from a range of sources including EUKLEMS, the UK and EU 
Labour Force Survey and others, covering the period from 1995 to 2013, they employ a 
growth accounting approach to look at impact of skills on the whole economy level and an 
econometric approach to look at impacts at the industry level. The countries covered by 
their analysis were Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the USA and the UK. Findings 
from the growth accounting exercise showed that:  
• While Total Factor Productivity contributed most to productivity growth pre-crash (30 
per cent), upskilling of the workforce accounted for 20 per cent of labour productivity 
growth; 
• Growth would have been lower following the 2008 crash had it not been for the 
contribution of skills to labour composition; 
• Qualifications at the high-skilled level account for the greatest contribution of skills 
to labour productivity growth between 2002 and 2007; 
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• Even during a period of weak growth, skills continue to have a positive effect on 
growth. 
Meanwhile, findings from their econometric analysis showed that: 
• The proportion of the workforce with high skills is positively associated with higher 
productivity outcomes (an increase in the proportion of the labour force with a 
degree level qualification by ten per cent increases productivity by two per cent);  
• While the effect of upper-intermediate skills on productivity appears to be in the 
positive direction, the effect was not always found to be significant in their analysis; 
• Workplace training was positively associated with productivity (a ten per cent 
increase in the availability of training increases productivity by two per cent); 
• High-level academic skills were found to have a greater impact on productivity in 
industries with high ICT intensity, while upper-intermediate skills were found to have 
more effect in industries with high capital investment in non-ICT;  
• High-level and upper-intermediate skills also have a stronger effect in industries with 
high innovation property investment, although the effect was stronger for high-level 
skills. 
Although it is hard to know from their research whether qualifications obtained at the lower-
intermediate level were gained at school or through further education post-18, the research 
suggests a strong effect of education on productivity, particularly for higher education. 
Using the same methodological approach Mason et al.’s (2014) research resulted in similar 
findings, although in their analysis they were able to distinguish between the contributions 
to growth of vocational and general qualifications at the lower-intermediate level. Covering 
the period from 1980 to 2007, their analysis focused on data from six EU countries with the 
countries selected because of their dominant modes of delivery for VET: apprenticeships 
in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands; vocational schooling in France, Sweden and 
the UK. General findings across the sample of countries were: 
• Skills were found to have a stable long-run effect on average labour productivity 
(ALP), but a weaker short-run effect; 
• The effects of skills on productivity vary depending upon the level and mode through 
which they were gained; 
• Upper-intermediate skills49 have a positive effect on ALP, particularly in production 
sectors and in countries where apprenticeships predominate as the means to VET; 
                                            
 
49 Mason et al. (2014) call this category ‘upper-intermediate vocational’ because courses covered at this 
level tend to be aimed at specific jobs or occupations. 
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• Lower-intermediate VET reinforce the productivity inducing effects of ICT, 
particularly in countries where apprenticeships predominate; 
• Higher-level skills reinforce the productivity effects of ICT, especially in countries 
where VET tends to be delivered in the classroom; 
• There are complementarities between different types of education in different 
industries, such that skills gained at a higher level tend to increase the productivity 
of skills at a level below; 
• The effect of VET qualifications are more pronounced in countries where VET tends 
to take the form of apprenticeships. 
In relation to the UK, Mason et al. (2014) found that although Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) was the main contributor to growth in the UK (more than 50 per cent) and capital 
deepening was the second (around 30 per cent), skills contribution to growth in the UK 
(around 18 per cent) was high relative to Sweden, Germany and France, and on a par with 
Denmark and Netherlands. Furthermore, higher-level skills were found to be the main 
driver of skills-related productivity growth during the period (explaining around 61 per cent), 
relative to intermediate skills (vocational 20 per cent and general 17 per cent 
approximately). 
The three studies reviewed in this section, published since the Quadrants Report, suggest 
that by and large there would appear to be fairly strong evidence that education leads to 
stronger growth at the aggregate level. While Holmes’ study suggests that some types of 
HE may have a stronger impact on growth and that moving to a mass HE system has not 
necessarily had the desired effect in terms of growth, all the other studies reviewed in this 
chapter do provide evidence that intermediate level qualifications (vocational and general) 
and higher level qualifications have a positive impact on productivity and economic growth. 
3.3 Post-18 education can facilitate entrepreneurial activity 
The recent evidence base for the effect of post-18 education on entrepreneurial activity in 
the UK is not well developed. The Quadrants Report highlighted just one source providing 
evidence of a link between HE and increased entrepreneurial activity (Bloom et al., 2006). 
Bloom et al. cited findings from the 2002 ‘Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’ (GEM) 
(Reynolds et al., 2002) that reports data using the Total Entrepreneurship Activity (TEA) 
index – which measures the share of adults involved in new firms and start-ups – covering 
17 countries. The findings showed that individuals with higher levels of education had 
higher levels of entrepreneurship activity and that entrepreneurs who were more educated 
created more jobs than those who were less educated.  
Analysis of the GEM also found a statistically significant correlation between enrolments in 
tertiary education and engagement in high potential entrepreneurial activity (HPEA) 
(r=.38), whereas primary and secondary enrolments were not correlated with HPEA 
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(Reynolds et al., 2002). However, as Bloom et al. themselves note, while bivariate 
relationships, such as these, are broadly supportive of the idea that education leads to 
greater engagement in entrepreneurial activity, they do not prove causation. 
Van Praag, Van Witteloostuijn and Van der Sluis (2009) have attempted to investigate the 
causal effect of education on entrepreneurial activity, albeit in the US and not the UK. Using 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), that followed a cohort of 
respondents who were aged 14 to 22 in 1979 covering the period from 1979 to 2000, the 
authors estimated the effect of education (measured by years in education) on 
engagement in entrepreneurial activity (as measured by self-employment and company 
owner/directorship) compared to normal employment. They found that education was 
negatively associated with engagement in entrepreneurship, with every additional year of 
education decreasing the probability of entrepreneurial activity by between one and four 
percentage points. However, they did find that education had higher wage returns for 
entrepreneurs than for employees. Their findings were robust even when controlling for 
selectivity of choosing entrepreneurial positions and for the endogenous effects of ability 
on education. The authors noted that the negative relationship between education and 
choosing entrepreneurial work is surprising given the higher returns to education for 
entrepreneurs and argue that this suggests an informational deficiency. 
Van Der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2008) made a similar discovery in their meta-
analysis of 94 studies containing 299 observations covering the period from 1980 to 2002 
investigating the link between education and entrepreneurship. Their research suggests 
that there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between education and selection into 
entrepreneurial activity. However, there was evidence that education does lead to better 
outcomes for those who do choose entrepreneurship, including for earnings, growth of 
company and survival. Finally, while the returns to education appear to be higher for 
entrepreneurs than for employees in the US, studies covering European countries found 
no such relationship. Thus, in the absence of any more compelling evidence it would 
appear that the effect of education on entrepreneurial activity may be less clear cut than 
previously thought. 
This perhaps should be unsurprising given the mixed results of attempts at including a 
greater level of enterprise and employability skills in the curriculum in HE. Surveys that ask 
graduates to assess the level of skills development consistently find that entrepreneurial 
skills are less well developed than other skills (e.g. Lyonette, Hunt and Baldauf, 2017; 
Purcell et al., 2012; Ball, Pollard and Stanley, 2010). This may have as much to do with 
the motivations of students as it does with the difficulties HEIs face in trying to incorporate 
enterprise and entrepreneurship related skills into the curriculum. There is evidence from 
the same studies that graduates of subjects where entrepreneurial skills are more likely to 
be seen as important, such as business and administration and creative arts and design, 
tend to report greater development of skills in these areas. 
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In a qualitative study looking at the reasons why students and graduates may choose an 
entrepreneurial path or decide against it Nabi, Walmsley and Holden (2015) found that the 
decision whether to start-up a business was influenced by a range of push and pull factors 
that worked in different ways for different people, with the information received during their 
studies being one of them (albeit not the most important one). Their research involved 
longitudinal qualitative interviews with 15 graduates some of whom were involved in start-
ups and some who were not (despite initially wanting to). The push and pull factors can be 
seen as fitting in within three main categories:  
• Personal characteristics – freedom/autonomy, entrepreneurial identity, drive 
urgency and tenacity;  
• Environment, support and context – labour market context, university/institutional 
support (curriculum and extra-curricular advice), and family and significant others; 
and  
• The business idea itself – nature of the idea, financial capital required, and 
complexity/feasibility of the idea.  
There was some evidence that course content aimed at increasing enterprise and 
entrepreneurial understanding could help increase knowledge and confidence which could 
enhance the attractiveness and perceived desirability of entrepreneurial activity. However, 
it could also have the opposite effect by giving students a realistic view of the challenges. 
The authors note, however, that of the push and pull factors found in the research, 
enterprise related content was not such a strong factor in graduates decisions. 
Overall, then, the evidence for the effects of education on entrepreneurial activity is mixed. 
While there is some evidence of a correlation between education level, and particularly 
higher education, and engagement in entrepreneurial activity, studies that have tried to 
isolate the effect of education on entrepreneurial activity have failed to support the 
existence of a relationship. However, there appears to be more support for the idea that 
education may facilitate the success of entrepreneurial activity, with start-ups being more 
likely to grow and survive and with entrepreneurs tending to see higher financial returns to 
their education than employees, although this may not always be the case. 
3.4 Post-18 education can stimulate innovation 
Innovation is considered as a key part of both UK and EU economic strategy and is seen 
as a key driver of economic growth and as a route to a high-skill, high-wage economy 
(BEIS, 2017; European Commission, 2010). This approach is built to a large extent on a 
growing body of literature that sees technological change as increasing demand for high-
level and intermediate-level technical skills (e.g. Levy and Murnane, 1992, 2013), although 
there continues to be debate about the full impacts of technological innovation on jobs and 
job quality (e.g. Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2016; Erhel and Guergoat-Larivière, 2016). 
However, despite the interest in innovation and its effect on jobs and labour-market 
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change, our searches found relatively few studies directly investigating the relationship 
between education and increased innovation at the firm or industry level, something that 
has been noted elsewhere (Brandenburg, Gunther and Schneider, 2007). 
The Quadrants Report highlighted two sources that purport to show evidence that HE leads 
to greater innovation and labour-market flexibility. First, the 2009 UK Innovation Survey50, 
outlined in the supporting analysis for the HE White Paper (BIS, 2011), showed that firms 
that are innovation active51 tend to have a higher proportion of their workforce on average 
who are science graduates (five per cent) or graduates generally (eight per cent) than firms 
who are not innovation active (one and three per cent respectively).  
Second, the Quadrants Report cited findings from a US study by Florida, Gates, Knudson 
and Stolarick (2006) that found a positive correlation between the number of students per 
capita in an area and measures of talent including the proportion of those aged 25 or over 
who hold a degree and the proportion of people working in creative occupation (broadly 
defined including management, business and healthcare occupations) as well as ‘super-
creative’ occupations (e.g. computing, engineering, arts and design and media 
occupations). While the main focus of Florida et al.’s analysis is the impact of universities 
on growth through its impact on the ‘3Ts’ – technology, talent and tolerance – the research 
suggests that a university’s impact on innovation and creativity goes wider than direct 
contribution to knowledge creation and exchange, and plays a major role in attracting and 
retaining talent and raising the stock of human capital in an area. 
More recent findings from the 2015 UK Innovation Survey (BIS, 2016) suggest that if 
anything, demand for higher level skills among innovating firms has increased since 2009. 
Organisations that reported some form of innovation activity had a higher proportion of 
their workforce on average that were science and engineering graduates (twelve per cent) 
or graduates of other subjects (15 per cent). This compares to four per cent science and 
engineering and ten per cent graduates of other subjects for non-innovating firms. While 
these figures cannot answer the question as to whether higher levels of education or skills 
lead to innovation, or whether innovative firms require more graduates, they do suggest an 
association between high-level skills and innovation. 
Brandenburg, Gunther and Schneider (2007) have investigated the causal relationship 
between education and innovation at the firm level in Germany. The research looked at 
whether qualification level is related to innovation at the firm level using the linked 
employer-employee dataset (LIAB), a firm-level annual panel survey of 15,000 German 
                                            
 
50 The UK Innovation Survey is part of the EU-wide Community Innovation Survey, and is a survey of 
organisations employing ten or more people the 2009 survey covered 14,281 businesses in the UK, while 
the 2015 survey covered 15,091 businesses. 
51 Innovation active was defined as those that had introduced new products, services or processes, had 
active R&D projects or had R&D, training or acquisition expenditure linked to innovation projects. 
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firms with individual-level data including all workers covered by the country’s national 
insurance scheme. Their analysis focused on manufacturing firms with more than ten 
employees using both formal qualification level and an occupational measure of 
qualification as independent variables and four measures of innovation as dependent 
variables: 1) improvement of an existing product, 2) introduction of a new product,                  
3) creation of market novelty, and 4) any of the above three innovations.  
While qualification level was associated with increased innovation at the bivariate level, 
with firms in industries with higher levels of qualification tending to innovate more than 
those with lower qualification levels, multivariate analysis at a firm level found no significant 
relationship between qualification level and innovation. However, a statistically significant 
interaction between research and development intensity and qualification level suggests 
that, where highly qualified individuals are engaged on research and development (R&D) 
activity, firms tend to innovate more. With the findings contributing to the mixed evidence 
on the importance of human capital (usually the share of employees with an HE degree) 
as a driver of innovation, citing a number of studies employing a cross-country or German 
data (Dakhli and De Clercq, 2003; Rammer et al., 2005; Gunther and Gerbhardt, 2005), 
the authors conclude that more research is needed to investigate whether there are 
qualitative aspects of qualification level that determine a firm’s innovative capacity. 
However, overall, their research suggests that the relationship between higher-level skills 
and innovation may be more complex than policy generally assumes. 
While the empirical evidence supporting a link between education, skills and innovation 
may be mixed there is no shortage of literature detailing the ways in which education and 
skills contribute to innovation in theory. Mason and Rincόn-Aznar (2015) review the 
literature in this area and outline some of the mechanisms by which high level skills and 
graduates are thought to contribute to innovation and productivity, as follows: 
1. Graduates are 'well placed' to generate new ideas and knowledge related to 
innovation and can help firms take advantage of new technology (citing Bresnahan 
et al., 2002; Autor et al., 2003; Hollenstein, 2004; Bayo-Moriones and Lera-López, 
2007);  
2. Through knowledge transfer between and within firms, sectors and countries, 
through collaboration on R&D, 'technical problem-solving among skilled workers 
involved in supply chains', mobility of workers between firms, and though attracting 
foreign direct investment, which also often has the added benefit of bringing with it 
new technologies (citing Lundvall, 1992; Saxenian, 1994; Barrell and Pain, 1997; 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003); and  
3. Through increased 'absorptive capacity' - ability to make sense of knowledge, ideas 
and technology (both external and internal to the organisation) (citing Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; Zahra and George, 2002). Intermediate-skilled workers can also 
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contribute to innovation and productivity through absorptive capacity because they 
are ideally-placed to suggest efficiencies (citing Toner, 2010; Prais, 1995). 
Some of the proposed mechanisms have significant overlaps with those highlighted by 
literature in relation to productivity spillovers, perhaps underlining the interrelated nature of 
innovation and skills on the one hand and productivity and growth on the other. 
Overall, as with the evidence on the entrepreneurial activity, the literature investigating the 
links between education and innovation (let alone specifically looking at post-18 education) 
is less well developed relative to other areas reviewed in this chapter. And while there is 
some evidence of a correlation between education and innovation, the evidence of a causal 
relationship is not so clear. It would appear that while having a well-educated workforce 
may not necessarily lead to greater levels of innovation in a firm, putting more educated 
employees to work on R&D related projects does stimulate innovation. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has attempted to update the literature on the benefits of higher education for 
economic activity and productivity and to broaden out the scope to include other forms of 
post-18 education. The review found that while there is an abundance of literature 
examining the productivity and growth inducing effects of education, there is rather less 
evidence in the literature in relation to the effects on entrepreneurship and innovation. The 
literature review has found the following: 
1. Education increases the productivity of individuals and has spillover effects 
for colleagues and others working in the wider industry or network – research 
shows that these effects can be significant for all levels of post-secondary 
education, but may be particularly strong for graduates and for vocational 
qualifications at the intermediate level; 
2. Education contributes to economic growth – there is fairly strong evidence that 
education leads to stronger growth at the aggregate level. This is true for 
intermediate level qualifications and higher level qualifications, although there may 
be some evidence that certain types of graduates (such as researchers and science 
and engineering graduates) may stimulate growth more than others; 
3. Education can facilitate entrepreneurial activity – while there would appear to 
be little evidence to support a causal relationship between increased levels of 
education and chances of engaging in entrepreneurial activity, there is some 
evidence to suggest that education helps facilitate entrepreneurial success; 
4. Education can stimulate innovation – as with entrepreneurial activity, while we 
found little evidence to support a direct causal link between education levels and 
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innovation, there is some evidence that those with higher levels of education can 
help make use of innovation and can help turn R&D activity into innovation. 
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4 Health and wellbeing outcomes  
The evidence on the health and wellbeing benefits of education is relatively sparse and 
can come from a wide range of academic disciplines. As a consequence this chapter is 
briefer than other chapters in the review and the evidence is of a more variable quality and 
relevance. 
The Quadrants Report identified a number of different health and wellbeing outcomes 
associated with participation in higher education covering both physical and mental health, 
including evidence on: 
• Life expectancy; 
• Smoking;  
• Alcohol consumption; 
• Obesity; 
• Preventative care; 
• Physical health more generally (assessments of own health); 
• Life satisfaction; 
• Mental health; 
• And educational parenting. 
Most of the evidence highlighted in the Quadrants Report referred to non-UK data or 
reported on the effects of education more generally rather than specifically about HE. Our 
review reinforces and extends the evidence base on the health and wellbeing benefits of 
education, with the sources reviewed here covering a range of benefits and types of 
education and with most drawing upon UK data. From studies employing a combination of 
bivariate and multivariate analyses, the review found evidence to support the following 
benefits of education: 
• Improved self-confidence and self-esteem; 
• Greater wellbeing and happiness; 
• Improved coping with mental health and physical disabilities; 
• Greater ability to assist with children’s education; 
• Greater job satisfaction and sense of being valued by employer. 
However, not all of the outcomes identified in the literature are positive. There was 
evidence that education could lead to outcomes that could be viewed as positive, negative, 
or neutral, depending upon one’s point of view: 
• Over-education and/or job mismatch could lead to lower life satisfaction; 
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• Greater awareness of health information could lead to risky responses to health 
scares; 
• Education is associated with delayed and reduced childrearing. 
As some of the studies highlighted here cover more than one benefit or outcome, we 
discuss each study in turn highlighting the benefits and the type of education covered in 
the text, focusing on the more positive outcomes first. 
4.1 Post-18 education can lead to improved confidence, self-
esteem, wellbeing and quality of life 
Firstly, a study carried out by London Economics and IPSOS MORI (2013a) looked at the 
financial and non-financial benefits of further education in the UK. The research involved a 
survey of 4,000 FE learners who had either completed a course or had left the course 
early. Those studying apprenticeships and various active labour market programmes were 
excluded from the research. Completers reported the following self-reported benefits: 
• 82 per cent said that their self-confidence and self-esteem had increased; 
• 75 per cent said it helped them keep active and make use of their time; 
• 58 per cent reported increased job satisfaction; 
• 55 per cent reported increased ability to help children with their homework; 
• 52 per cent said it had helped them deal with a health problem or disability; 
• And 60 per cent said it had improved their quality of life. 
Simple bivariate analysis showed that completers in the study were more likely to report 
these outcomes than non-completers. The study also employed multivariate techniques to 
assess whether learning had led to greater wellbeing and life satisfaction. The analysis 
revealed that while a level 2 completion was significantly related to greater wellbeing, level 
3 completions were not. 
Using the same survey data the researchers also carried out a separate analysis focusing 
on 1,995 learners who were not in employment at the start of their FE course (London 
Economics and IPSOS MORI, 2013b). Using simple bivariate analysis and self-reported 
outcomes the researchers found that of the completers: 
• 81 per cent gained confidence/self-esteem as a result of the course;  
• 72 per cent said they would take on more activities or voluntary work;  
• 76 per cent reported that it helped keep them active and make a better use of their 
spare time;  
• 75 per cent said it helped them get a better idea of what to do with their life;  
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• 66 per cent said it improved their quality of life; and 
• 30 per cent said it enabled them to help their children with school work. 
A similar but separate study also commissioned by BIS surveyed 1,000 adult learners who 
had studied a Maths or English course at level 2 or below (BIS, 2013b). Employing a set 
of slightly more sophisticated measures of satisfaction and wellbeing, the researchers 
found that learners increased their scores on a range of psychometric scales, including life 
satisfaction, mental well-being, locus of control and self-esteem. In addition, more than 
three-quarters of those with children said that they felt more able to help their children with 
their homework, and more than two-fifths said that they had increased the number of times 
they had helped their children with homework during the previous week. The study did not 
include a control group and so, by the authors’ own admission, only provides weak 
evidence of causality. 
 
Jenkins and Mostafa (2012) investigated the impact of formal and informal learning on the 
wellbeing of older adults aged 50 to 69 using data from the English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing (ELSA). After controlling for other factors using panel regression models (and 
therefore attempting to isolate the causal effect of learning) as well as marital and work 
status, informal learning such as gym and exercise classes and arts, music and evening 
classes were found to be significantly related to improvements in wellbeing, as measured 
by CASP-19 quality of life scores. While obtaining a qualification was also found to be 
significantly related to increased wellbeing, formal learning without a qualification was not. 
The associated rise in wellbeing was estimated to be roughly equivalent to a move from 
the bottom to middle quintile of the wealth distribution, or equivalent to one-sixth of the 
wellbeing of being in 'fair' as opposed to 'poor' health, and was large enough to offset the 
decline in wellbeing associated with ageing or unemployment. The analysis was carried 
out using a nationally representative sample covering four waves of the ELSA from 2002 
to 2009. 
Bosworth, Giernalczyk, Hogarth and Vogler-Ludwig (2011) investigated the wider social 
benefits of Vocational Education and Training (VET) using multivariate analysis 
techniques. VET was broadly defined to include any education or training aimed at 
equipping people with knowledge, know-how, competencies and skills required in specific 
occupations or in the labour market more broadly. This includes Initial VET (IVET), normally 
carried out before entering the workplace, and Continuing VET (CVET), carried out after 
IVET or after entering the workplace aimed at updating skills/knowledge. The researchers 
combined data, focusing on the workplace level, from a range of sources including: 
Continuing Vocational Training Survey, European Working Conditions Survey, and the 
European work-life balance survey. The researchers also carried out 25 case studies 
across four sectors and eight countries. The researchers found that:  
1) Training that was funded by the employer increased employees satisfaction 
with their working conditions;  
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2) Conversely, training that was paid for by the employee themselves reduced 
satisfaction with working conditions; 
3) Jobs that place higher intellectual demands on employees tend to attract 
higher satisfaction, but employees are less keen on problem solving 
(particularly fire-fighting) and the relationship between job demands and 
satisfaction are complex; and  
4) Individuals with a good skills match are more satisfied than those who are 
over-qualified.  
The qualitative research suggested that training can: improve job content (job enrichment); 
provide skills to manage conflict in the workplace (which would otherwise lead to 
dissatisfaction); send a signal that the employer is investing in them (feeling valued); and 
provide a social context to share experiences so that problems and solutions can be 
shared. Overall, the research suggested that vocational education and training delivered 
through the workplace can increase job satisfaction and make employees feel valued by 
their employer. 
4.2 Over-education can lead to lower life satisfaction 
On the other hand, one recent study has suggested that more education does not always 
lead to greater life satisfaction. Drawing upon data from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) covering the period from 1991 to 2007, Piper (2015) found that the rapid 
expansion of HE relative to higher-level jobs has led to an increase in the proportion of 
young people who are overeducated and that this over-education is significantly related to 
lower levels of life satisfaction.  
Piper defined over-education as where an individual’s education level (years in education) 
was more than one standard deviation above the average for someone in the same 
occupational group (or industry occupation for a more stringent measure). Multivariate 
analysis techniques were then used to regress over-education onto a measure of life 
satisfaction52 while taking account of a range of other variables that were predicted to be 
related to satisfaction. Piper found that those who were overeducated were less likely to 
be satisfied with their life than their peers, although the effect was found to dissipate over 
time, perhaps as people accept the new situation. 
                                            
 
52 Answers to the question ‘How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?’. 
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4.3 Education can have unexpected effects on health-related 
choices and behaviours 
In addition, studies have shown that higher levels of education can lead to health related 
outcomes that may not always be considered favourable. One such example can be seen 
in that of Anderberg, Chevalier and Wadsworth’s (2009) study where higher level of 
education was associated with parents choosing not to get their child immunised with the 
MMR vaccine (with many apparently choosing not to opt for individual replacements 
either).  
Using administrative data as well as data from the Health Survey England and the 
Millenium Cohort Study, Anderberg et al. investigated the effect of education level 
(measured by staying on in education after the age of 19) on uptake of the MMR vaccine. 
They also controlled for income and other factors using multivariate analysis techniques, 
during the period when there was widespread controversy around the safety of the vaccine. 
During the peak of the controversy in the media (1999-2001) uptake of the vaccine saw a 
21 per cent reduction compared to pre-controversy levels. At the same time uptake of the 
individual vaccines was between 2.9 and 5.3 per cent, corresponding to just 24 to 45 per 
cent of those who rejected the MMR vaccine, which means for some, the decision not to 
have the MMR vaccine might be considered as a risky choice. Anderberg et al. found that 
education level had a strong negative effect on uptake of the MMR vaccine and also 
appears to have had a ‘spillover’ effect to other vaccines, suggesting that while education 
level appears to have enabled them to absorb health information quickly, the health scare 
surrounding the controversy led them to ‘overreact’ leaving some children unvaccinated. 
Finally, two separate studies, one in the UK and one in Japan, used multivariate analysis 
techniques to investigate the effect of educational level on childrearing behaviour, in terms 
of timing and number of children. Tavares (2016) used data from the British Household 
Panel Survey to investigate whether personality traits and education level (below A Level, 
A Level, above A Level) helped predict the age at which women chose to have their first 
child. The findings revealed that education did have an impact on maternity timing, with 
more educated women choosing to have their first child later.  
Meanwhile, Nozaki (2017) used data from the Japanese General Social Survey to 
investigate what factors are determinants of the number of children that a woman chooses 
to have in their lifetime, with education measured in terms of years in education and 
whether they stayed on in education until age 19. Nozaki found that women with a higher 
level of education tended to have fewer children. While the choice of if and when to have 
children is clearly a highly personal choice and there are no value judgments implied in the 
findings of these studies, they do provide evidence that education may be an important 
factor in contributing to health related decisions and behaviours. 
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4.4 Summary 
Overall, while the literature in relation to the health and wellbeing effects of education is 
perhaps less well developed than other areas covered by this review, there is evidence to 
suggest that education can have implications for a lot of health related factors.  
For example, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests the following: 
1. Education can lead to self-reported improvements on a range of subjective 
measures – bivariate analysis suggests a range of types of education can lead to 
self-reported improvements in: self-confidence and self-esteem; wellbeing and 
happiness; coping with mental health and physical disabilities; and ability to assist 
with children’s education; 
2. Education can improve wellbeing and quality of life – econometric analysis 
suggests that completion of an FE course at level 2 leads to higher life satisfaction 
and, in a separate study, fixed effects panel regressions found that informal learning 
and formal learning leading to a qualification can lead to increased wellbeing as 
measured by quality of life scores. Formal learning not resulting in a qualification, 
on the other hand, does not appear to have the same effects. Less sophisticated 
analysis focusing on adult learners also suggests that Maths or English studied at 
level 2 or below may also have similar effects on self-reported quality of life;  
3. Education can lead to greater job satisfaction and a sense of being valued by 
an employer – research combining qualitative research and multivariate analysis 
showed that VET delivered through the workplace can improve life and job 
satisfaction, can lead to job enrichment and can make employees feel valued by 
their employer; 
However, on the other hand there was some evidence that: 
4. Over-education can lead to lower levels of life satisfaction – there is evidence 
to suggest that where an individual’s education level far exceeds the average level 
of the typical worker working in the same occupational group they may be more 
likely to have lower levels of life satisfaction; 
5. Education can have unexpected effects on health-related choices and 
behaviours – the review found evidence that higher levels of education were 
significantly related to parents choosing not to get their child immunised and are 
linked to childrearing choices, with more highly educated women tending to have 
fewer children, and have children later on in life. 
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5 Benefiting local communities? 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to assess the ways in which post-18 education benefits local communities, the 
literature search focused on the role of post-18 education in promoting community 
cohesion and associated factors, such as tolerance of diversity, that promote good 
relationships within communities. 
The Quadrants Report53 identifies social cohesion as a benefit of higher education. 
Primarily, this looks at the engagement of students and universities with their local 
communities. Examining the post-2013 literature provides limited evidence on the 
relationship between post-18 education type and community cohesion, but significant 
literature on factors related to community cohesion.  
Some authors have argued that attitudes provide a more accurate measure of engagement 
than studies of, for example, voting turnout. They suggest that people, and in particular 
young people, may be engaged in society and have an interest in various issues affecting 
society generally, but may be disillusioned with political processes54. This chapter 
examines the literature on three aspects of this: attitudes towards immigration and diverse 
communities and, in particular, the development of more tolerant attitudes; attitudes 
towards personal relationships; and attitudes towards welfare recipients. By far the largest 
body of literature exists on attitudes towards immigrants, and the related issues of national 
identify and belonging. 
Changes in the attitudes of people with post-18 education are particularly significant as 
this is a growing proportion of the population, and consequently their attitudes are 
increasingly important in driving change in society. Research for the ESRC in 2014 showed 
that having a degree had a significant effect on tolerance and other attitudinal measures 
related to community cohesion55.  
                                            
 
53 BIS (2013a) ibid 
54 See, for example, Rheingans, R. and Hollands, R. (2013). ‘‘There is no alternative?’: challenging 
dominant understandings of youth politics in late modernity through a case study of the 2010 UK student 
occupation movement’, Journal of Youth Studies 16:4, 546-564 and Henn, M. and Foard, N. (2014) ‘Social 
differentiation in young people's political participation: the impact of social and educational factors on youth 
political engagement in Britain’, Journal of Youth Studies 17:3, 360-380. 
55 ESRC. (2014). The wellbeing effect of education, ESRC Evidence Briefing, published July 2014 
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5.2 Post-18 education increases tolerance towards 
immigrants 
Easterbrook et al. (2016) found that education effects were most strongly observed when 
examining negative attitudes towards immigrants. Education explained over ten per cent 
of the variance in this measure in the UK56. 
The British Social Attitudes Survey asks a question about attitudes towards the scale of 
immigration to Britain: ‘Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should 
be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little or reduced a 
lot?’. Analysis of responses between 2010 and 2013 to this question by Brennan et al. 
(2015) shows that overall, more than three quarters of respondents (77 per cent) thought 
that the number of immigrants coming to Britain should be reduced, and over half (56 per 
cent) thought it should be reduced a lot57. Differences in attitudes were found to be related 
to education levels, with 86 per cent of people with no qualifications and those with GCSEs 
stating that the number of immigrants should be reduced. While this figure was still high 
amongst graduates (59 per cent), it was much lower than amongst other educational 
groups. 
Figure 5.1 Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should change? 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the 2010 – 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey 
                                            
 
56 Easterbrook, M., Kuppens, T. and Manstead, A.S.R. (2016). ‘The Education Effect: Higher Educational 
Qualifications are Robustly Associated with Beneficial Personal and Socio-political Outcomes’. Soc Indic 
Res, 126, 1261–1298 
57 Brennan et al. (2015) ibid 
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When controlling for background characteristics, a linear, incremental pattern was not 
observed. While respondents from all other educational groups were more likely than 
graduates to think that the number of immigrants should be reduced, there was more 
consistency across the other educational groups, with all being between ten and 13 
percentage points more likely to believe immigration should be reduced.  
Figure 5.2 Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should change? regression 
analysis 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the 2010 – 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey 
Two further questions from the BSAS related to tolerance of immigration were analysed 
by Brennan et al. (2015). These indicators were whether respondents thought that 
migrants coming to Britain was generally good or generally bad for the British economy 
and whether Britain’s cultural life was undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live 
in Britain from other countries. Responses to both these questions were found to be 
significantly related to educational level. Approximately 20 per cent of respondents with 
degrees thought that immigration generally had a negative impact on the economy, but 
this figure was as high as 60 per cent amongst both those with no qualifications and those 
whose highest qualification was GCSEs. An almost identical pattern can be seen when 
looking at perceptions of the impact of immigration on cultural life. 
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Figure 5.3 Would you say that Britain's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants 
coming to live here from other countries? 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the 2010 – 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey 
This relationship remained significant when controlling for background characteristics58. 
Respondents with A Levels and those with an HE or FE qualification below degree level 
showed very similar attitudes to each other but that were significantly different than those 
shown by graduates. People whose highest education level was GCSE or who had no 
qualifications also displayed similar attitudes. There was a bigger gap in attitudes between 
graduates and those with an HE or FE qualification below degree level (approximately 14 
percentage points) than there was between those with an HE or FE qualification below 
degree level and those whose highest qualification is GCSEs or lower (approximately six 
percentage points). 
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Figure 5.4 Effect of different educational levels on whether felt immigration was bad or good for 
British economy: Regression analysis 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the 2010 – 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
Figure 5.5 Effect of different educational levels on whether felt immigration undermined or enriched 
cultural life: Regression analysis 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the 2010 – 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey 
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5.3 Post-18 education increases tolerance of cultural 
difference 
Multiculturalism, as a political project that supports ethnic minorities to maintain their 
cultures while still being part of the wider British community has been criticised for creating 
‘parallel-lives’ and posing as a threat to national unity59. It has been associated in political 
discourse with radicalism and extremism60. Consequently, social cohesion has been 
posited as a new political project that stresses shared British values and identities to 
promote national bonding61. 
Participation in FE has been found to be positively associated with social cohesion by 
SQW Ltd et al. (2013). It was found to facilitate the development of social networks and to 
combat isolation. This finding was based on self-reported information from interviews and 
a 1,016 (Wave 1) and 665 (Wave 2) participant longitudinal survey of adult literacy and 
numeracy learners, i.e. those with low qualifications who were now participating in FE. The 
authors note that the benefits of this form of adult learning could be seen particularly 
amongst groups that tended to be solitary and/or cut off from wider society (e.g. the 
unemployed, single parents and those with mental and emotional difficulties). All of whom 
are significant groups amongst adult learners undertaking basic skills education62.  
Similarly, when looking at participants in adult FE, following the work of Dolan et al. in 
201263, a learner survey by London Economics and Ipsos MORI found that social cohesion 
was positively related to participation in adult FE. They took a broad definition of social 
cohesion incorporating some of the issues discussed in Chapter 2, namely civic 
participation and involvement in voluntary and socio-political groups64. Research on 
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community learning65 and on learning below Level 366 shows a similar effect on combating 
isolation and increasing community involvement.  
Using data from the 2012 FP7 EUCROSS mixed methods project on ‘Europeanisation of 
Everyday Life’, Duru et al. (2017) found that people with tertiary education were more likely 
to perceive a diverse society as a good thing. When asked whether they agreed that ‘it is 
a good thing for society to be made up of people from different ethnic groups, religions and 
cultures’, overall 80 per cent of the 1001 British respondents agreed67.  
Research by McCollum et al. (2014) suggests that patterns in views concerning ethnic 
diversity are likely to be fairly consistent across the UK. They analysed the 2011 British 
Social Attitudes Survey and the 1200-1500 respondent 2002, 2006 and 2010 Scottish 
Social Attitudes Surveys to look specifically at the attitudes of people in Scotland. They 
found that higher educational levels were associated with a decreased propensity to see 
ethnic minorities taking jobs from other people in Scotland or to see multiculturalism as a 
threat to Scotland’s identity68. As has been noted previously, Scotland is the nation where 
educational levels appear to have a lower impact on various attitudes and behaviours, so 
it may be possible to assume that if this pattern remains clear in Scotland, it is likely to do 
so for the other three nations.  
The perceived threat to national identity posed by cultural difference is a common theme 
in the literature linking attitudes to educational participation. Taking a step back, research 
by Brennan et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between national identity and 
educational participation using the 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey69. The BSAS asked 
respondents living in England whether they consider themselves to be more English or 
more British or both equally. In line with possibly more liberal and cosmopolitan attitudes 
discussed in Chapter 2, graduates were more likely than other groups to consider 
themselves ‘more British than English’ or ‘British not English’. Overall, 36 per cent of 
graduates considered themselves to be more British than English, a significantly higher 
proportion than amongst any of the other educational groupings. Compared with those 
whose highest qualification was an HE or FE qualification below degree level, a slightly 
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higher proportion of respondents whose highest qualification was A Levels said that they 
considered themselves to be more British than English (23 per cent of those with A Levels 
compared with 21 per cent of those with a below degree level HE/FE qualification). This is 
similar to the proportion of respondents with no qualification (20 per cent) and slightly 
higher than the proportion of those whose highest qualification was GCSEs or equivalent.  
Controlling for background characteristics, the significance of the difference between HE 
graduates and those whose highest qualification was an HE or FE qualification below 
degree level disappears, but there was still a significant relationship between educational 
participation and feelings of Britishness amongst the other educational groups. 
The 2013 BSAS also asks what makes people ‘truly British’. Analyses of this data by 
Brennan et al. (2015) and Kiss and Park (2014) show differences across the educational 
groups in terms of the importance of being born in Britain and the importance of shared 
beliefs and traditions.  
Whilst graduates were fairly evenly divided between those who regarded being born in 
Britain as very or fairly important (53 per cent) and those who saw it as not very important 
or not important at all (47 per cent). The proportion of respondents who saw being born in 
Britain as important was higher amongst respondents from all other educational groups70. 
Figure 5.6 How important is being born in Britain for being truly British? 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013. Respondents 
resident in England only 
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Controlling for other background factors, the impact of educational participation on 
attitudes towards Britishness showed one of the most significant degrees of correlation 
across the attitudinal variables in the BSAS. 
Figure 5.7 Effect of educational levels on whether respondents felt it was important to have been 
born in Britain to be truly British: Regression analysis 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013. Respondents 
resident in England only 
Conversely, educational participation appeared to have no significant relationship with 
attitudes related to the role of shared culture and traditions in Britishness. The 2013 BSAS 
measures this using responses to the statement ‘It is impossible for people who do not 
share Britain’s customs and traditions to become fully British’. While statistical analysis 
shows differences between educational levels, with graduates being least likely to agree 
with the statement (40 per cent) and around 60 per cent of the other groups agreeing, 
when background characteristics are controlled for, the only statistically significant 
difference is between graduates and those whose highest qualification is an HE or FE 
qualification below degree level.  
The reasons for this are unclear. While the group of respondents with HE or FE 
qualifications below degree level generally show more similarities to the lower qualification 
groups in their attitudes towards both immigration and cultural difference, the scale of the 
difference in their attitudes when compared to graduates is unexpected, particularly given 
that they are a more heterogeneous group than those with lower qualifications when 
defining their own national identity. However, as will be seen later in this chapter, there are 
significant differences in the attitudes of respondents with a degree and those whose 
highest qualification is an HE or FE qualification below degree level across a range of 
variables associated with tolerance and community cohesion, including attitudes towards 
female employment. 
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Figure 5.8 Effect of educational levels on whether respondent felt it was impossible for people who 
do not share Britain’s customs to become British 
 
NB: Blue bars denote statistically significant coefficients; grey bars non-significant ones 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013. Respondents 
resident in England only 
5.4 Post-18 education promotes tolerance of personal 
difference 
The literature search provided evidence of research relating educational participation to 
two aspects of tolerance around personal identity and difference. The first of these is in 
relation to gender roles and the second concerns attitudes towards sexuality. 
Evidence on attitudes towards gender roles focuses primarily on the role of the curriculum 
in different subjects and its relationship with identity development. Abbas et al. (2016) used 
a longitudinal mixed methods approach, combining 98 interviews with first year and 31 
second and third year sociology students at four universities with reviews of curricula 
documents and recordings of seminars, to examine the development of feminist 
knowledge71. Similarly, Guest (2016) used interviews with 25 self-identified feminist 
women aged between 20 and 35 to examine shifts in political identity and engagement 
with academic feminism in graduates’ narratives of ‘becoming feminist’, finding that 
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university experience legitimised and enabled articulation of pre-existing ‘feminist 
instincts’72. 
Taking a more quantitative approach, Paterson’s (2014) analysis of the British Household 
Panel Survey 1991 to 2008 showed that although there is no clear relationship between 
increasing education and support for women’s rights, there is one exception, and that is 
the strong positive association between possession of degree-level academic 
qualifications and support for women’s rights73.  
Brennan et al.’s (2015) detailed analysis of the British Social Attitudes Survey examined 
respondents’ attitudes towards specific issues related to women’s employment74 using 
questions asking whether respondents believe that family life suffers when the woman has 
a full-time job and whether they think that women are more concerned about a home and 
children than employment.  
They found that, controlling for background variables, there was no significant relationship 
between education participation and views on these issues, with the exception of 
differences between graduates and those who hold an HE or FE qualification below degree 
level. Participants whose highest qualification was A Levels or equivalent showed a more 
similar pattern of attitudes to graduates in their responses to the statements than those 
whose highest qualification was an HE or FE qualification below degree level. More than 
60 per cent of those with a degree level qualification disagreed that family life suffers when 
the woman has a full-time job, compared with just over 40 per cent of those with HE or FE 
qualifications below degree level, those with GCSEs and those with no qualifications. 
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Figure 5.9 All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 
Controlling for other variables, respondents whose highest qualification was an HE or FE 
qualification below degree level were ten percentage points more likely than those with a 
degree to think that family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job, while there was 
no statistically significant relationship amongst the other groups, most likely reflecting the 
impact of age on responses to questions on social attitudes. 
Figure 5.10 Effect of educational participation on agreement with the statement ‘All in all, family life 
suffers when the woman has a full-time job’: regression analysis 
 
NB: Blue bars denote statistically significant coefficients; grey bars non-significant ones 
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Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 
Similarly, when looking at responses to the statement ‘A job is all right, but what most 
women really want is a home and children’, there were differences between the 
responses of the people in different educational groups, with 62 per cent of graduates 
disagreeing to some extent, compared with under a third (32 per cent) of those with no 
qualifications. As in the case of attitudes towards female employment and family life, 
those with A Levels as their highest qualification shared the most similarities with 
graduates in their responses, and there was a linear relationship between increasing 
education levels and increasing disagreement with the statement. However, as with the 
previous question, responses by those whose highest qualification was an HE or FE 
qualification below degree level disrupt this pattern. While they were no more likely than 
those with A Levels to say that they agreed with the statement, they were significantly 
less likely to say that they disagreed.  
Figure 5.11 Effect of educational participation on agreement with the statement ‘A job is all right, 
but what most women really want is a home and children: regression analysis  
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 
Together with the findings from the review of literature on political participation, the findings 
suggest that individuals whose highest qualification is an HE or FE qualification below 
degree level are a relatively politically engaged group, but also hold quite traditional values.  
This appears to support Paterson’s (2014) findings that it is not just the amount of 
education that matters, but the kind of education75. Using data from the British Social 
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Attitudes Survey (BSAS), Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSAS), British and Scottish 
Election Surveys, National Child Development Study (NCDS), 1970 British Cohort Study, 
and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) including the British Youth Panel, he found 
that it is possible to have quite a lot of education, including vocational further or higher 
education, but that in some cases, vocational education can be associated with more 
traditional views.  
In addition to questions about gender roles, the British Social Attitudes Survey asks 
questions about attitudes towards same-sex relationships. Again, those whose highest 
qualification is an HE or FE qualification below degree level disrupt the linear relationship 
between educational attainment and liberalism and tolerance of difference. Almost three 
quarters of respondents (73 per cent) with a degree thought that sexual relations between 
two adults of the same sex were not wrong at all, and the proportion of respondents with 
A Levels giving this response was similar (72 per cent), but there was a ten percentage 
point difference between these two educational groups and those with an HE or FE 
qualification below degree level. 
Figure 5.12 What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex… Are they always 
wrong, mostly wrong, sometimes wrong, rarely wrong, not wrong at all? 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 
These bivariate patterns are likely to be strongly related to the age of respondent in each 
group, particularly as older respondents are disproportionately more likely to have no 
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qualifications76. However, even when controlling for age and other background 
characteristics, Brennan et al. (2015) found a significant relationship between education 
participation and attitudes towards same-sex relationships.  
Figure 5.13 Effect of educational participation on attitudes towards same-sex relationships 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 
5.5 Post-18 education promotes tolerance of different 
experiences 
In Chapter 2, we presented evidence to suggest that students and graduates were likely 
to engage in volunteering because they thought that although they had worked hard, there 
had been some degree of luck involved in their achievement of their current position. This 
section further examines the relationship between education participation and attitudes 
towards people who may be considered less fortunate, focusing in particular on how post-
18 education is related to attitudes towards those receiving welfare benefits.  
There have been several studies that broadly associate increases in education with 
different attitudes towards benefit claimants, but these have tended to be inconclusive77. 
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The most robust analysis of attitudes towards welfare recipients uses data from the British 
Social Attitudes Survey. Brennan et al. (2015) analysed responses to three statements 
about welfare benefits and their recipients: ‘Many people who get social security don’t 
really deserve any help’; ‘Most people on the dole are fiddling it one way or another’; and 
‘If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet’. 
It might be expected that the generally more liberal views expressed by graduates would 
mean they are less likely to agree with these statements. On the other hand, graduates 
are less likely than other groups to have experienced unemployment and consequently 
there may be more social distance between graduates and welfare recipients and less 
shared experience that would encourage them to express more tolerant views.  
Brennan et al.’s analysis suggests that both these theses may be correct. Although 
graduates were more likely than other educational groups to disagree with these 
statements, the difference between graduates and the other educational groups was 
smaller than has been seen in relation to other attitudinal variables outlined previously in 
this report. However, despite this, the relationship between educational participation and 
attitudes towards benefits recipients was statistically significant when controlling for other 
variables. Although the analysis was unable to control for an individual being a benefit 
recipient themselves, the analysis did control for economic activity (including 
unemployment, and income)78. It should be noted that across all three questions 
concerning attitudes towards benefits recipients, a large proportion of respondents give 
neutral responses, i.e. they neither agree not disagree with the statements provided. 
Overall, 42 per cent of respondents with a degree level qualification disagreed to some 
extent that people who claim benefits do not deserve help. There is a linear relationship 
between level of education and propensity to think that benefits recipients do not deserve 
help, with 30 per cent of those with an HE or FE qualification below degree also 
disagreeing. The exception to this pattern occurred with those with no qualifications who 
were more likely to disagree than respondents with GCSEs or A Levels, most likely 
reflecting the higher rates of benefit receipt amongst this group. Differences related to 
educational attainment remained significant when controlling for background 
characteristics. 
Responses to the statements regarding the likelihood of benefits recipients committing 
benefit fraud and the probability of welfare recipients ‘standing on their own two feet’ if 
welfare benefits were not so generous showed very similar patterns. Again, graduates 
were the least likely to agree with both statements.  
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Figure 5.14 Effect of educational levels on whether people felt that many people who get social 
security don’t really deserve any help 
 
Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 
Nineteen per cent of graduates agreed that most people on the dole were ‘fiddling it one 
way or another’, with the level of agreement increasing as educational levels fell. The 
exception to this was that those with A Levels were slightly less likely to agree (33 per 
cent) than those with a below degree HE/FE qualification (36 per cent). In contrast to views 
about benefit recipients deserving help, those with no qualifications were the most likely to 
agree that benefit recipients were fiddling the system (45 per cent). Regression analysis 
found large significant differences by educational level when controlling for other factors. 
Figure 5.15 Effect of educational levels on whether respondents thought that most people on the 
dole are fiddling it one way or another 
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Source: Brennan et al. (2015) using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 
A similarly strong relationship was found between education level and whether 
respondents thought that the benefits system encouraged dependency. As in the case of 
other attitudinal variables, graduates were more likely to hold liberal views, with 43 per 
cent agreeing that the benefits system encouraged dependency, and respondents with an 
HE or FE qualification below degree level demonstrating less liberal attitudes than might 
be predicted by their educational level (61 per cent agreed that the generosity of the 
benefits system encouraged dependency, the highest figure amongst all the educational 
groups).  
5.6 Summary 
The literature reviewed in this chapter shows that post-18 education has a mixed impact 
on attitudes associated with community cohesion 
1. Overall, participation in HE appears to promote tolerance, but there is much less 
evidence of education levels below HE having a similar impact;  
2. Those with an FE or HE qualification below degree level show much less 
tolerant attitudes than would be predicted by their education level. This 
suggests that volume of education alone is not enough to promote for tolerant 
attitudes, but that greater attention needs to be paid to the type of education 
concerned and the type of learning and the attitudes and values it promotes. There 
has been little analysis of factors such as the relationship between subject studied 
(except for some studies on feminism in the social sciences), type of institution 
attended or the interaction between education and the wider social environment in 
development of attitudes and values; 
3. Post-18 education FE promotes the development of social networks and 
social cohesion, although evidence suggests that this is a situational benefit 
rather than one related to learning, as it was the act of attending classes and 
consequently meeting people that appeared to have the biggest effect on 
combatting social isolation; 
4. Education level is related to holding more tolerant views on immigration, but 
there is not a linear incremental relationship. People with a degree level 
qualification hold significantly more tolerant views on immigration, but there is no 
significant difference between respondents with different levels of education below 
degree level; 
5. Education levels are much less closely associated with attitudes towards 
multiculturalism and gender roles than they are to attitudes towards immigration 
and views about the recipients of welfare benefits. 
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6 Wider economic, social and cultural benefits to the 
UK? 
6.1 Introduction 
Education as a vehicle for social mobility and a route out of poverty is central to policy 
debates. Education is seen to enhance human, social and cultural capital in a way that 
makes individuals more competitive in the labour market. 
Within the literature, there are various theories linking education participation and social 
mobility: 
• Human capital theory suggests that education is a source of human capital and hence 
productive capacity that will be rewarded with higher financial returns in the labour 
market.  
• Screening and signalling theory posits that participation in education acts as a signal 
of productive potential which includes both skills-based and socio-cultural assessments 
of the worth of the individual and their suitability for employment.  
• Job competition theory suggests that education promotes social mobility simply 
because it makes an individual more competitive because they possess certain skills 
and experiences that are relatively scarce in the labour market.  
• Incentive-enhancing preference theory holds that education is an agent of 
socialisation and gives individuals the values, norms and preferences that make 
employers regard them as more or less suitable for different types of work. 
Much of the literature related to social mobility focuses on widening access to HE and FE, 
making the assumption that this, in itself, is the key to promoting social mobility. It is 
certainly the case that if poorer students are less likely to access HE or higher level FE, 
then they will be subsequently unlikely to access higher level jobs or to achieve higher 
levels of income (both measures used as a proxy for social mobility). However, there is 
little evidence in the literature that looks at the outcomes of post-18 education for social 
mobility. Access to HE or FE is just the start, but much of the literature treats it as a 
destination in itself. Linked to this, there is little literature that examines cumulative 
development of social capital or the cumulative impact of ‘capital deficit’ as an individual 
moves through the education system. 
In assessing the wider benefits of post-18 education, this chapter looks at the literature 
published since 2013 on the relationship between educational participation and the 
development of social capital and then on the relationship between educational 
participation and social mobility. These are, of course, interlinked variables, as the 
development of social capital promotes social mobility, but there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence that investigates these two concepts together. 
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6.2 Post-18 education promotes the development of social 
and cultural capital 
In recent years, there has been relatively little literature published using primary research 
to investigate the relationship between educational participation and the development of 
social capital. In part, this is because social capital is a multifaceted concept which can be 
measured in different ways and research on some measures, such as developing an 
empirical understanding of social networks and their effects, is an emerging area in 
academic and policy research. There is a far larger body of literature that takes a theoretical 
approach (usually following Bourdieu) to social capital development, drawing to a limited 
extent on secondary data. 
Most of the primary research identified in the literature used qualitative methods to examine 
the experience of students while they were in higher or further education and to relate 
these experiences to their preparedness for entering the labour market.  
Pemberton and Humphris (2018) carried out research involving focus groups and semi-
structured interviews with 40 individuals who had experienced material deprivation during 
their childhood or young adulthood and who had at least two years’ experience of the 
labour market post-education79. Their sample included a mixture of graduates and those 
with FE qualifications. They found that although HE and FE can provide opportunities to 
develop social and other types of capital, factors associated with social class and pre-
existing ‘capital deficits’ meant that participants were often unable to fully take advantage 
of these opportunities. This was particularly true in comparison to their wealthier peers. As 
a consequence, education did not necessarily promote the development of social capital 
and social mobility, and instead could be seen as a factor further entrenching 
disadvantage. They identify various reasons for this: 
• Participants believed that they lacked the necessary cultural capital to successfully 
navigate educational institutions to access extracurricular opportunities; 
• Participants also lacked the economic resources to enable them to access these 
opportunities and were limited in the time they had available as they needed to work 
alongside their studies; 
• Lower levels of pre-existing social and cultural capital meant that participants found it 
harder to adapt to education, particularly higher education. Consequently, they spent 
more time trying to adapt, particularly academically, which further inhibited their 
participation in extracurricular activity and other mechanisms for building soft-
credentials. Even once they had settled in, these participants were likely to focus more 
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on achieving a good degree, rather than pursuing internships or other activities that 
would enable them to develop soft skills and social networks. Using Bathmaker et al.’s 
(2013) terminology, they were still playing an old game, but that game had moved on80; 
• Lack of cultural capital and the lower levels of self-confidence that often accompanied 
it, made it difficult for some participants to build relationships with academics81. Without 
these connections, participants were unable to access resources, including academic 
and emotional support, as well as extracurricular opportunities including internships, that 
may have enabled them to develop social capital.  
As a result of these barriers to social and cultural capital development, Pemberton and 
Humphris (2018) found that there was a group of respondents who were unable to 
envisage a route into fulfilling work. Despite having high levels of aspiration, this group 
generally experienced static or stalled mobility, moving from education into low-waged 
work. This group contained both graduates and those who had obtained FE qualifications. 
They were likely to believe that they had not built the right networks or taken part in the 
right work experience to ease their transition into the labour market.  
Similarly, some respondents were attempting to enter professions with poorly defined 
routes of entry, such as the media and creative arts. They had a relatively clear idea of 
what they wanted to do but less idea of how to get there and consequently had needed to 
adapt their ambitions. Respondents in this group had often identified a career path 
relatively late in their educational careers and were now trying to develop suitable networks 
and experience outside education. This group can be seen as a contrast to those who had 
embarked on very vocational courses with clearly defined career outcomes. This group 
often showed higher levels of social capital both before and after they entered HE and were 
particularly likely to have social networks that acted as important information channels. 
While the respondents in Pemberton and Humphris’ research did not know ‘how to play 
the game’, Bathmaker et al. (2013) found that while their participants from lower social 
classes knew the rules of the game, they did not have the kind of instinctive feel for it that 
those from higher social classes had developed as a result of their prior educational and 
social experiences, and consequently, they were not as ready to play as their more 
advantaged peers82.  
Bathmaker et al. followed 80 students at two contrasting universities through their 
undergraduate degrees between 2010 and 2013. They found that the students were aware 
that a degree (educational capital) was no longer enough to guarantee the labour market 
outcomes they wanted and that to gain a positional advantage they would need to mobilise 
                                            
 
80 See Bathmaker, A.-M., Ingram, N. & Waller, R. (2013) ‘Higher Education, social class and the 
mobilisation of capitals: recognising and playing the game’. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 34:5-
6, 723–743. 
81 See also Jack, A. (2016) ‘(No) Harm in Asking: Class, Acquired Cultural Capital, and Academic 
Engagement at an Elite University’, Sociology of Education, 89:1, 1-19 
82 Bathmaker et al. (2013) ibid 
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additional capitals that might be gained through a variety of non-academic activities. 
However, while this was true of all students, there were differences in how students were 
able to mobilise these additional capitals. They use the example of access to internships 
to show how working-class students were unable to immediately draw upon pre-existing 
social networks and other forms of social, cultural and economic capital to create a cycle 
of social capital development. 
6.3 Post-18 education promotes social mobility 
As in the case of the literature on development of social capital, more theoretical 
contributions to the debate on education and social mobility dominate the sources identified 
during the literature search. These studies are not reviewed for the purpose of this review 
as they provide no new primary data on the benefits of post-18 education. However, it is 
worth noting that these theoretical contributions have become increasingly pessimistic 
about the role of HE, in particular, as a vehicle for social mobility83. Marginson (2016) 
argues that the expansion of HE, particularly though the development of hybrid HE/FE 
qualifications and institutions, has resulted in vertical stretching and stratification leading 
to an increasingly hierarchical system of fields of study and HEIs, and the sorting of people 
in this system reflects their social backgrounds, reinforcing existing inequalities84. 
Bathmaker (2017) similarly suggests that the same processes may occur within FE and 
between FE and HE85. 
Literature investigated for this review generally takes as a starting point the view that higher 
or further education participation acts as a mediating factor in class formation. Using 
regression analysis, much of this work seeks to identify the factors that lead to reproduction 
of social classes, i.e. the movement of children into the same social class as their parents 
(measured by either occupation or income), and the extent to which education can 
intervene or account for these processes.  
Macmillan and Vignoles (2013) used data on 2006/07 HE graduates (those aged 18 to 25 
only) from the Destinations of Leavers from Higher Educations (DLHE) survey to examine 
whether a graduate’s social class is linked to their likelihood of entering the highest status 
occupations86. They found that at six months after leaving university when controlling for 
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academic achievement, degree subject, degree class and university choice, there was no 
link between social class and chances of securing a high status occupation.  
However, three years after graduation they found that more socially advantaged graduates 
were more likely to be in the high status occupations. This suggests that social class has 
an impact on determining who benefits most from HE and that HE has a relatively weak 
mediating role in overcoming disadvantage three and a half years into graduates’ careers. 
They found that there was also a regional dimension to this impact, as while there is a link 
between socio-economic background and chance of entering the highest status 
occupations for students in England and Wales, the same link is not seen amongst Scottish 
domiciled students.  
Using the 1946 and 1970 Birth Cohorts, Goldthorpe (2016) found that the link between 
social class and returns to HE is unclear87. While the expansion of HE would be expected 
to lead to greater meritocracy in recruitment into the professions, Goldthorpe found that 
when controlling for scarcity of qualifications, HE cannot completely reduce the effect of 
social class on opportunity. Additionally, parental attainment and consequent labour 
market advantage can be seen to shield graduates from higher social groups from 
downward social mobility.  
Evidence on the role of FE in promoting or hindering social mobility is relatively scarce 
compared to the evidence on HE. Using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and 
its successor Understanding Society (1998 to 2012), Gloster et al. (2015) found that the 
children of highly educated parents are more likely than those of lower educated parents 
to benefit from FE in terms of access to managerial occupations88. Focusing on adult 
learners aged over 19, their sample includes all participants who took part in any adult 
learning in the preceding year, including learning up to Level 3 and episodes of learning 
not leading to a qualification. They found that although the effect of parental education 
becomes smaller when a control for the individual’s own education is introduced, 
particularly five years post-education, overall it appears that FE is acting as a mediator in 
class reproduction. However, this is not the case when looking at entry to managerial 
occupations and the elite professions.  
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Bukodi (2017) presents a similarly mixed picture when considering the impact of further 
education on social mobility and class reproduction89. Using the 1970 British Cohort Study, 
Bukodi showed that individuals from higher social classes benefit the most from FE. They 
are more likely to use FE as part of a process of life-long learning, particularly if their current 
class position is lower than that of their parents. She found that while someone from a 
salariat background has relatively poor initial academic performance, they can increase or 
update their academic qualifications in FE which increases their chances of becoming part 
of the salariat themselves. In contrast, individuals from a working-class background who 
enter the labour market in a working-class position may be able to increase their 
qualifications though FE participation, but this does not result in upward occupational 
mobility. She concludes that qualifications obtained through life-long learning primarily 
serve to maintain, rather than to narrow inequalities in life chances. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has shown that the relationship between post-18 education and the 
development of social capital and social mobility is not as straightforward as might have 
been imagined. Following various theories of social mobility, HE and FE should serve as 
mediating factors in class reproduction because they provide participants with 
opportunities to develop social (and other types of) capital which they can then utilise in 
the labour market, but the evidence to support this is mixed. 
1. Educational participation does not act as a mediating factor and vehicle for 
social mobility to the extent that might be supposed. This is particularly the case 
when assessing the longer-term benefits of HE. Regression analysis has shown that 
more socially advantaged graduates are more likely to be in higher status careers 
three and a half years after graduation when all other factors are controlled for; 
2. HE expansion has increased stratification resulting in an increasingly 
hierarchical system of fields of study and HEI that perpetuates the sorting of people 
by social background;    
3. In some cases HE and FE further entrench existing disadvantage because 
more disadvantaged participants are unable to access social capital-building 
activities to the same extent as their more advantaged peers due to their prior 
‘capital deficit’ resulting in the cumulative development of disadvantage; 
4. Social, cultural and economic capital all impact on an individual’s ability to 
benefit from higher levels of education. Qualitative research suggests that more 
disadvantaged groups lack the knowledge to successfully navigate the HE system, 
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the economic capital to participate fully in it, and the cultural capital to understand 
the benefits that may potentially be available to them.  
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7 Conclusion 
This report has aimed to review the literature in relation to the wider benefits of post-18 
education for individuals and society. It has sought to update the evidence base in relation 
to the benefits of HE and broaden out the scope to include other forms of post-18 
education, such as intermediate and higher level taught courses delivered through further 
education as well as vocational education and training.  
The review found that the evidence in relation to each of the five main research questions 
identified at the beginning of the research is patchy at times, and often does not allow us 
to disentangle education carried out at different levels and/or obtained at different ages. 
With those caveats in mind the review found evidence of the following benefits in relation 
to each of the research questions: 
Civil Engagement 
1. Post-18 education increases the propensity to vote – despite the geographical 
mobility of HE students and graduates, education is a strong predictor of voting 
behaviour. There is a correlation between highest level of education and propensity 
to vote. Although there is little evidence of causation between education level and 
the act of voting, there is between level of education and attitudes towards political 
processes, which may in turn increase propensity to vote; 
2. Post-18 education increases participation in political action – educational level 
is correlated with likelihood of participating in political action, but sub-degree level 
HE graduates, rather than HE graduates, have the highest levels of participation 
indicating that there is not a linear relationship between these two issues; 
3. Post-18 education increases political interest – political interest is lowest 
amongst those with the lowest levels of education and highest for those with the 
highest levels of education, but there is not a statistically significant difference 
between HE graduates and those with HE or FE qualifications below degree level; 
4. Post-18 education increases political efficacy – those with higher levels of 
qualifications are less likely to feel that politics is too complicated for them, although 
determining causality is complicated as people who more easily understand 
complex issues may also be more likely engage in higher levels of study; 
5. Post-18 education increases engagement in political issues – more educated 
individuals are more likely to feel that they understand the background to various 
political issues, making them more likely to engage and act upon their evaluation of 
these issues. However, there is not a linear relationship between highest education 
level and engagement, and on many measures there is no statistically significant 
difference between the attitudes of people with A Levels and people with HE or FE 
qualifications below degree level.  
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6. Post-18 education increases altruistic volunteering – adults who had completed 
an FE course felt more able to engage in volunteering than previously, but the 
evidence was not always so clear on this point. 
Economic Activity and productivity 
1. Education increases the productivity of individuals and has spillover effects 
for colleagues and others working in the wider industry or network – research 
shows that these effects can be significant for all levels of post-secondary 
education, but may be particularly strong for graduates and for vocational 
qualifications at the intermediate level; 
2. Education contributes to economic growth – the studies reviewed suggest that 
there is evidence that education leads to stronger growth at the aggregate level. 
This is true for intermediate level qualifications and higher level qualifications, 
although there may be some evidence that certain types of graduates (such as 
researchers and science and engineering graduates) may stimulate growth more 
than others; 
3. Education can facilitate entrepreneurial activity – while there would appear to 
be little evidence to support a causal relationship between increased levels of 
education and chances of engaging in entrepreneurial activity, there is some 
evidence to suggest that education helps facilitate entrepreneurial success; 
4. Education can stimulate innovation – as with entrepreneurial activity, while we 
found little evidence to support a direct causal link between education levels and 
innovation, there is some evidence that those with higher levels of education can 
help make use of innovation and can help turn research and development activity 
into innovation. 
Health and wellbeing 
1. Education can lead to self-reported improvements in a range of subjective 
measures – a number of studies suggest various forms of education can lead to 
improvements in: confidence and self-esteem; wellbeing and happiness; coping with 
mental health and physical disabilities; and ability to assist with children’s education; 
2. Education can improve wellbeing and quality of life – multivariate analyses 
suggest that completion of an FE course at level 2, formal learning leading to a 
qualification more generally and informal learning can lead to increased wellbeing 
as measured by life satisfaction and quality of life scores. Formal learning not 
resulting in a qualification, on the other hand, does not appear to have the same 
effect; 
3. Education can lead to greater job satisfaction and a sense of being valued by 
an employer – research combining qualitative research and multivariate analysis 
showed that VET delivered through the workplace can improve life and job 
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satisfaction, can lead to job enrichment and can make employees feel valued by 
their employer; 
4. However, over-education can lead to lower life satisfaction – there is evidence 
to suggest that individuals whose education level is much higher than the average 
level within the same occupational group are more likely to report lower levels of life 
satisfaction in the short term;  
5. And education can also have unexpected effects on other health-related 
choices and behaviours – reviewed studies found that higher levels of education 
were significantly related to parental choice not to get a child immunised and were 
linked to choices about childrearing, with more highly educated tending to have 
fewer children, later in life. 
Local communities 
1. Education increases tolerance, but this is only true for participation in degree-
level education. Those whose highest qualification is an HE or FE qualification 
below degree level show lower levels than might be expected given their 
educational participation across a range of measures, including in their attitudes 
towards immigration, gender equality and views about welfare recipients;  
2. Volume of education is not an accurate predictor of attitudes that promote 
community cohesion. The type of education (i.e. level, institution type and possibly 
subject area) is also important; 
3. Education can promote community cohesion but the mechanisms through which 
post-18 education influence community cohesion are unclear. The literature 
suggests that the role of FE colleges in providing a location where people can meet 
others may be as important as any benefits related to the teaching curriculum or 
qualifications obtained while in FE.  
Wider economic, social and cultural benefits 
1. HE and FE provide opportunities for the development of social capital, but the 
ability to take advantage of these opportunities is related to prior social capital 
development; 
2. The relationship between post-18 education and social mobility is not 
straightforward. Increased HE and FE participation has not resulted in the entirely 
meritocratic job market some theorists envisaged. Social class continues to play an 
important role in preventing downward mobility of people from higher social classes 
as well as limiting the extent to which HE and FE can act as a mediating factor in 
class reproduction; 
3. Higher education has a relatively weak mediating role further into graduates’ 
careers – three and a half years after graduation more socially advantaged 
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graduates are more likely to be in the highest status occupations when holding all 
other factors constant; 
4. Education can entrench existing disadvantage – while there is potential for post-
18 educational participation to result in desirable social and cultural benefits for 
individuals and society, there is also a risk that it can further entrench existing 
disadvantage due to the impact prior experience and background has on HE and 
FE experience. Instead of reducing inequality, there is a risk that post-18 education 
experience can reinforce and perhaps even extend existing patterns of advantage 
and disadvantage leading to the development of cumulative disadvantage that 
extends into the labour market and can have a life-long impact on economic, social 
and cultural outcomes.  
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